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THE NEED TO CRIMINALIZE REVENGE PORN: HOW A LAW
PROTECTING VICTIMS CAN AVOID RUNNING AFOUL OF THE
FIRST AMENDMENT
ADRIENNE N. KITCHEN*
INTRODUCTION
Revenge Porn is a growing problem with potentially horrific consequences.1 There are thousands, perhaps tens of thousands, of victims.2 Virtually unheard of only four years ago,3 revenge porn occurs when an exparamour posts sexually explicit images of his former lover on the web,
often with “disparaging descriptions” and contact information for the victim’s work and home, and sometimes even for her family members.4 The
purpose of revenge porn is to humiliate and harass former lovers.5 Revenge
porn can happen when the victim willingly took a photo specifically for her
paramour, or when perpetrators captured the images using a hidden camera
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1. Janice Richardson, If I Cannot Have Her Everybody Can: Sexual Disclosure and Privacy
Law, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON TORT LAW 145, 145 (Janice Richardson & Ericka Rackley eds.,
2012); Elizabeth M. Ryan, Sexting: How the State Can Prevent a Moment of Indiscretion from Leading
to a Lifetime of Unintended Consequences for Minors and Young Adults, 96 IOWA L. REV. 357, 363–64
(Nov. 2010); Eric Schulzke, California Lawmakers Target ‘Revenge Porn’ but Miss, Critics Say,
DESERET NEWS, Sept. 20 2013, http://www.deseretnews.com/article/865586019/California-lawmakerstarget-revenge-porn-but-miss-critics-say.html (quoting Erica Johnstone).
2. Robert Lang, Lawmaker, A.G. Candidate Wants Crack down on “Revenge Porn”, WBAL
NEWS, Oct. 29, 2013, http://www.wbal.com/article/103619/37/template-story/Lawmaker-A.
3. Lorelei Laird, Victims are Taking on ‘Revenge Porn’ Websites for Posting Photos They
Didn’t Consent To, A.B.A. J. (Nov. 1, 2013),
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/victims_are_taking_on_revenge_porn_websites_for_posti
ng_photos_they_didnt_c/?utm_source=maestro&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=tech_monthly.
4. As the vast majority of victims are women, I will refer to the perpetrators as male and the
victims as female. Laird, supra note 3; Erica Goode, Victims Push Laws to End Online Revenge Posts,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/24/us/victims-push-laws-to-end-onlinerevenge-posts.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (revenge porn often includes “identifying details, like where
the women live and work, as well as links to their Facebook pages.”).
5. Ann Bartow, Copyright Law and Pornography, 91 OR. L. REV. 1, 44 (2012); Eric Goldman,
What Should We Do about Revenge Porn Sites Like Texxxan?, TECH., MKTG. & L. BLOG (Feb. 9, 2013),
http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2013/02/what_should_we.htm (defining revenge porn as “pornographic depictions of former lovers, ostensibly to get revenge on them.”) [hereinafter Goldman, What
Should We Do].
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or victim coercion.6 Often perpetrators link the images to the victim’s social networking pages or LinkedIn profile.7 Once the images appear on
several websites, a Google search for the victim’s name finds page after
page of these pictures.8
Numerous websites are dedicated to revenge porn.9 These sites permit
visitor comments, which are often “sexual, crude and insulting.”10 The
victims receive sexual solicitations from strangers.11 The abuse includes
rape threats, “false prostitution ads, [and] calling victims ‘sluts’—even
when the victim is a man.”12
Revenge porn causes harms tied to its vengeful nature—a privacy invasion that interferes with and sometimes destroys the victim’s relationships with others.13 Revenge porn victims lose or quit their jobs, they are
harassed by strangers, and some even change their names or alter their
appearance.14 Victims are often unable to attend college or find a job.15
Revenge porn targets “close down email accounts that have been flooded
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6. Bartow, supra note 5, at 44–45.
7. Laird, supra note 3; Mitchell J. Matorin, In The Real World, Revenge Porn is Far Worse than
Making it Illegal, TPM CAFÉ, Oct. 18, 2013, http://talkingpointsmemo.com/cafe/our-current-law-iscompletely-inadequate-for-dealing-with-revenge-porn; Ave Mince-Didier, Revenge Porn: Laws &
Penalties, CRIMINALDEFENSELAWYER.COM, http://www.criminaldefenselawyer.com/resources/revengeporn-laws-penalties.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2014) (“Many sites include identifying details, such as
the person’s full name, employer, and hometown, as well as links to the person’s Facebook or other
personal webpages, and nasty comments.”).
8. Laird, supra note 3; Emily Bazelon, Why do We Tolerate Revenge Porn? A New Bill in
California Tries to Address the Problem, but Doesn’t Go Far Enough, SLATE (Sept. 25, 2013, 6:21
PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/double_x/doublex/2013/09/revenge_porn_legislation_a_new_bill_in_cali
fornia_doesn_t_go_far_enough.html; Mary Anne Franks, Drafting an Effective “Revenge Porn” Law:
A Guide for Legislators, END REVENGE PORN (July 25, 2014),
http://www.endrevengeporn.org/main_2013/?page_id=656 [hereinafter Franks, A Quick Guide].
9. Mary Anne Franks, Unwilling Avatars: Idealism and Discrimination in Cyberspace, 20
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 224, 245 (2011) [hereinafter Franks, Unwilling Avatars].
10. Laird, supra note 3 (“observers . . . disparage victims as ‘stupid’ or ‘slutty’).
11. Bazelon, supra note 8; Franks, A Quick Guide, supra note 8, at 1.
12. Laird, supra note 3.
13. Elizabeth Adjin-Tettey, Sexual Wrongdoing: Do the Remedies Reflect the Wrong?, in
FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON TORT LAW 179, 181 (Janice Richardson & Erika Rackley eds., 2012)
(“Long-term harm may also be psychological, affecting self-esteem, feelings of safety, ability to focus
and obtain education, difficulties in maintaining employment and interpersonal relationships”).
14. Laird, supra note 3; Goode, supra note 4 (“It’s just an easy way to make people unemployable, undatable and potentially at physical risk,” quoting Danielle Citron); Suneal Bedi, California’s
Attempt to Avenge Revenge Porn, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 9, 2013, 11:21 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/suneal-bedi/california-revenge-porn_b_3879916.html (Revenge Porn
“has other consequences, like making it difficult to find a job.”).
15. Ryan, supra note 1, at 364 (“semi-nude and nude images can continue to affect a minor or
young adult’s reputation years after he or she creates and distributes the image. A sexting image that an
individual created when he or she was thirteen may influence his or her ability to gain admission to
college or gain employment years later.”).
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with abusive and obscene messages.”16 Victims suffer psychological
harm.17 Some resort to suicide.18 Others are “stalked, assaulted or even
killed.”19
Sixty to seventy percent of revenge porn victims are women.20 The objectification of women has been an issue for centuries, and online sexbased harassment started with the invention of the internet.21 New technology brings new privacy risks.22 Technology manifestly increases these
enhanced privacy risks because the information cannot be deleted, which
leaves revenge porn victims “feel[ing] branded.”23 While some people took
sexually explicit photos for significant others “[b]efore the Internet . . . compromising photos could do limited harm because they stayed
within a few people’s hands.”24 Today revenge porn sites are designed
specifically to “publicly shame, humiliate and degrade the victim” and
refuse to remove the images.25 Revenge porn is “potentially even more
pernicious and long lasting than real-life harassment.”26 This is true for
several reasons: 1) “it [is] difficult if not impossible for [victims] to engage
in self-help or legal remedies;” 2) harassers have a wide audience, including some “who will join in the harassment;” and 3) revenge porn “is accessible to almost anyone (the target’s co-workers, fellow students, clients,
children) almost anywhere (at her place of work, her school, her home, her
doctor’s office).”27 Some argue information on the internet lasts only as
long as interest in it remains or someone keeps it on the web.28 However,
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16. Franks, Unwilling Avatars, supra note 9, at 246.
17. Adjin-Tettey, supra note 13, at 181 (“Long-term harm may also be psychological, affecting
self-esteem, feelings of safety, ability to focus and obtain education, difficulties in maintaining employment and interpersonal relationships”); Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV.
61, 89 (2009).
18. Michael Salter et al., Beyond Criminalisation and Responsibilisation: Sexting, Gender and
Young People, 24 CURRENT ISSUES IN CRIM. JUST. 301, 303 (2012) (discussing the link between cyberbullying and teen suicide); Schulzke, supra note 1.
19. Franks, Unwilling Avatars, supra note 9, at 246.
20. Laird, supra note 3 (quoting University of Maryland law professor Danielle Citron).
21. Franks, Unwilling Avatars, supra note 9, at 243, 252.
22. Richardson, supra note 1, at 147; Salter et al., supra note 18, at 302–03 (discussing “the role
of digital technologies, such as mobile phones with camera capabilities, in enabling the selfmanufacture and distribution of naked or erotic sexts”).
23. Richardson, supra note 1, at 158–59 (discussing the psychological dangers of revenge porn
“when the material is private sexual material that was the content of a privacy invasion, particularly
when the motives were based upon revenge or associated with abuse.”).
24. Laird, supra note 3 (quoting attorney Erica Johnstone).
25. Id.
26. Franks, Unwilling Avatars, supra note 9, at 255.
27. Id. at 255–56.
28. Meg Leta Ambrose, A Digital Dark Age and the Right to be Forgotten, 17 J. INTERNET L.
(No. 3) 1, 9 (2013) (discussing how websites fail and information on the web has an expiration date);
Goldman, What Should We Do, supra note 5, at 16 (“distasteful content websites routinely fail on their
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although some revenge porn sites no longer exist, new ones continually
appear, and the images often appear on dozens of websites;29 even if one
site removes the images they are still available on several others. Ignoring
revenge porn does nothing to protect victims because the damage is not tied
to how long the images are posted: the damage is the loss of relationships,
jobs, opportunities, and self-esteem.30
In Part I, this Note demonstrates that victims currently have no effective legal recourse because civil suits, including privacy-based torts and
copyright claims, fail to remove images or deter perpetrators. Because a
greater deterrent is needed, revenge porn should be criminalized. Part II
analyzes current laws attempting to criminalize revenge porn, specifically
addressing the major concern regarding these laws—that they unconstitutionally prohibit too much speech. Finally, Part III proposes a solution to
protect victims’ rights that will avoid constitutional concerns, through the
First Amendment’s obscenity exception and through careful drafting, including examples of appropriate legislative language.
I. THE NEED TO CRIMINALIZE REVENGE PORN
Revenge porn is not a crime in most states so victims have no effective legal recourse.31 Additionally, revenge porn sites “are largely immune
to criminal pursuit”32 because federal statutes grant websites broad immunity. This exemplifies how the law has failed to keep up with technology.33 Even when crimes are alleged, revenge porn cases frequently result in
dismissal of the more serious—if not all—the charges.34 For example, a
35947-ckt_90-1 Sheet No. 132 Side B
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own accord, often quite quickly . . . . These shutdowns aren’t an accident. Inevitably, the website operators face enormous pressure from the media coverage, the public’s opprobrium, the threats of vendors
(especially payment service providers or ad networks) to cut off or reduce service, and yes, even the
legal risks. As a result, distasteful content websites have comparatively short shelf lives.”).
29. Mince-Didier, supra note 7.
30. Adjin-Tettey, supra note 13, at 181; Citron, supra note 17, at 92; Ryan, supra note 1, at 364;
Schulzke, supra note 1.
31. Ryan, supra note 1, at 361 (“the current state response to secondary sexting between young
adults is inappropriate because it leaves adult victims without meaningful remedies”); Matorin, supra
note 7; State ‘Revenge Porn’ Legislation, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Oct. 1, 2014),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/state-revenge-pornlegislation.aspx (ten states have criminalized revenge porn. Twenty-seven have pending legislation).
32. Goode, supra note 4; see generally Bartow, supra note 5.
33. Citron, supra note 17, at 90 (“To date, law enforcement’s response to online criminal activities has evolved slowly. Computer crimes are difficult to prosecute given law enforcement’s relative
unfamiliarity with technology.”).
34. People v. Barber, No. 2013NY059761, 2014 WL 641316, at *1 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. Feb. 18,
2014) (granting motion to dismiss a criminal case filed against a revenge porn perpetrator charged with
Aggravated Harassment, Dissemination of an Unlawful Surveillance Image and Public Display of
Offensive Sexual Material reasoning “defendant’s conduct, while reprehensible, does not violate any of
the criminal statutes under which he is charged.”); Franks, Unwilling Avatars, supra note 9, at 239, 244.
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2014 criminal case against a revenge porn perpetrator failed because his
“conduct, while reprehensible, d[id] not violate any of the criminal statutes
under which he [wa]s charged.”35 In short, “our current legal system isn’t
well-designed to redress user-submitted online pornography.”36
Because the purpose of revenge porn is to harm victims by disseminating sexually explicit images,37 and because “dozens or even hundreds of
other Web sites” redistribute those images, it is nearly impossible to remove them from the web.38 Filing a civil suit may exacerbate the problem—some revenge porn sites remove the photograph for a short time then
re-post it or even send it to other sites.39 Civil suits used to combat revenge
porn, such as privacy torts or copyright claims, frequently fail to do what
victims wish they would: remove the images and deter perpetrators.40 Tort
claims are insufficient remedies because reputation- and privacy-based
torts do not address the particular harms of revenge porn. Similarly, copyright claims fail to protect the victim from the reputational harms. Because
civil suits are insufficient remedies and fail to deter revenge porn posters,
new criminal laws are necessary to provide that deterrent.
A. Civil Suits are Insufficient Remedies because They Fail to do What
Revenge Porn Victims Most Want: Remove the Images and Deter
Perpetrators
Civil suits based on privacy violations are problematic. Most victims
want the offensive material removed and civil suits almost never succeed in
removing the images due to the sheer magnitude of dissemination.41 Highly
publicized trials often end in re-victimization.42 Civil litigation is expensive
35947-ckt_90-1 Sheet No. 133 Side A
01/14/2015 15:25:42

35. Barber, 2014 WL 641316, at *1.
36. Goldman, What Should We Do, supra note 5.
37. Bartow, supra note 5, at 46 (“Broad distribution is usually the goal of the revenge pornographer.”).
38. Ryan, supra note 1, at 363 (“[O]nce an individual transmits an image via cell phone or over
the Internet, it is virtually impossible to remove it.”); Goode, supra note 4; Bedi, supra note 14 (“[T]he
effects of revenge porn are amplified by websites dedicated solely to these kinds of posts! Talk about a
bad breakup—now they go viral.”); Mince-Didier, supra note 7 (“Images can also be easily picked up
by other websites, and content that is widely distributed on the Internet is difficult to remove. So, even
if a person succeeds in getting images removed from one site, it may be difficult or impossible to get
them completely off the Internet.”).
39. Laird, supra note 3 (quoting Attorney John S. Morgan).
40. Mary Anne Franks, Why We Need a Federal Criminal Law Response to Revenge Porn,
CONCURRING OPINIONS (Feb. 15, 2013, 9:51 AM),
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2013/02/why-we-need-a-federal-criminal-law-responseto-revenge-porn.html [hereinafter Franks, Why We Need a Response to Revenge Porn].
41. Id.
42. Id.
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and time-consuming, and many victims simply cannot afford it.43 It is difficult to identify and prove who the perpetrator is for legal proceedings because it is so easy to anonymously post and distribute revenge porn.44 Even
when victims can prove who the perpetrator is in court and win money
damages, many defendants are judgment-proof so victims cannot collect.45
Although judgment-proof defendants may be subject to injunctive relief, most victims would fail to meet the four requirements. To obtain an
injunction, plaintiffs must prove:
(1) [they] suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at
law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate . . . ; (3) that, considering
the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in
equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.46

Further, a court order requiring a defendant or website to remove the
images would fail to remove the images from the web entirely, particularly
as they appear on numerous sites.47 Because most perpetrators are judgment-proof, and injunctive relief may be difficult to obtain and would ultimately fail to remove the images, civil suits are “poor remedies.”48 As

35947-ckt_90-1 Sheet No. 133 Side B
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43. Citron, supra note 17, at 9 (“[H]igh cost of litigation often deters the filing of general tort
suits”); Nancy S. Kim, Web Site Proprietorship and Online Harassment, 2009 UTAH L. REV. 993, 1012
(“The remedies currently available require a victim of online harassment to file costly, time-consuming,
and often fruitless lawsuits. Although this may be a problem in the physical world, it is a greater problem in the virtual world.”); Franks, Why We Need a Response to Revenge Porn, supra note 40.
44. Franks, Why We Need a Response to Revenge Porn, supra note 40; Goldman, What Should
We Do, supra note 5, at 16 (“It’s more complicated assessing the liability of the users who post revenge
porn. We need to know more about how the defendants got the revenge porn and under what terms or
understandings.”).
45. Adjin-Tettey, supra note 13, at 193 (“Perpetrators are often judgment-proof, making it unlikely survivors will obtain compensation.”); Tracy Clark-Flory, Criminalizing Revenge Porn: As More
People Post Naked Pictures of Exes, the Law has failed to Keep Up. Some Activists are Trying to
Change That, SALON (Apr. 6, 2013, 8:00 PM),
http://www.salon.com/2013/04/07/criminalizing_revenge_porn/ (quoting Erica Johnstone, co-founder
of nonprofit Without My Consent); Franks, Why We Need a Response to Revenge Porn, supra note 40
(“the party responsible will not have enough financial resources to make a damages claim worthwhile
(i.e., the defendant will be judgment-proof)).
46. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006) (“According to wellestablished principles of equity, a plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction must satisfy a four-factor test
before a court may grant such relief. A plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an irreparable
injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for
that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy
in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.”); Amoco Production Co. v. Village of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 546 n.12 (1987).
47. Lori Andrews, California’s Revenge Porn Statute: A Start but Not a Solution, IIT CHICAGOKENT FACULTY BLOG (Oct. 4, 2013), http://blogs.kentlaw.iit.edu/faculty/2013/10/04/californiasrevenge-porn-statute-a-start-but-not-a-solution/ (reposted from On the Edges of Science and Law)
(“Nude photos posted on one revenge porn sites are often re-posted on dozens of other sites.”).
48. Pete Brush, 1st Amendment Poses Hurdle for NY ‘Revenge Porn’ Bills, LAW360 (Oct. 8,
2013, 7:39 PM), http://www.law360.com/newyork/articles/479052?nl_pk=9bab414e-81ff-4327-8aa1c3d17e01a0ec&utm_source=newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=newyork.
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perpetrators frequently have “nothing to lose, which is why they engage in
this behavior in the first place,” civil suits do not deter revenge porn.49
1. Tort Claims are Insufficient Remedies Because Reputation- and
Privacy-Based Torts Fail to Address Many Revenge Porn Harms

01/14/2015 15:25:42

49. Clark-Flory, supra note 45 (quoting Erica Johnstone, co-founder of nonprofit, Without My
Consent).
50. Adjin-Tettey, supra note 13, at 180 (internal citations omitted).
51. Clark-Flory, supra note 45 (quoting Erica Johnstone, co-founder of nonprofit, Without My
Consent); Franks, Why We Need a Response to Revenge Porn, supra note 40.
52. Adjin-Tettey, supra note 13, at 180.
53. Kim, supra note 43, at 1008.
54. Id. at 1006–07.
55. Franks, Why We Need a Response to Revenge Porn, supra note 40; Goldman, What Should
We Do, supra note 5, at 16 (“It’s more complicated assessing the liability of the users who post revenge
porn. We need to know more about how the defendants got the revenge porn and under what terms or
understandings.”).
56. Matorin, supra note 7.

35947-ckt_90-1 Sheet No. 134 Side A

In general, tort law fails to compensate revenge porn victims. Tort law
is “limited to those injured by the fault of others, who can afford the financial and emotional cost of initiating and maintaining civil suits, and are able
to prove their case on a balance of probabilities.”50 Tort suits are expensive
and fail to help victims because the suits do not remove the images, and the
defendants are frequently judgment-proof.51 Thus, tort claims are an inappropriate and incomplete remedy for revenge porn victims.52
Revenge porn is unique because of its widespread dissemination and
resulting harms. Anyone with internet access can post revenge porn anonymously for free, and it affects private individuals in a considerably more
public manner than was possible before the internet.53 While privacy torts
may protect victims from some reputational harms, revenge porn is different. It is the dissemination of a real picture designed solely to harass or
humiliate a private individual.
Revenge porn differs from other torts in several ways. While victims
may successfully sue those who posted negative comments about the images, so long as those comments are not deemed statements of opinion,54
victims may not succeed in actions against the actual posters because of the
difficulty proving the poster’s identity in court, particularly since the websites are not obligated to identify posters and anonymous distribution is so
simple.55 Privacy-based torts are only remedies against the person who
posted the photos; suits will not remove photos from Google search results
or from the internet itself.56 Even an injunction prohibiting a poster from
further dissemination fails to remove the images as they appear on multiple
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Ryan, supra note 1, at 363; Goode, supra note 4; Bedi, supra note 14; Mince-Didier, supra
Kim, supra note 43, at 1010.
Matorin, supra note 7; Franks, Why We Need a Response to Revenge Porn, supra note 40.
Franks, A Quick Guide, supra note 8, at 1.
Franks, Unwilling Avatars, supra note 9, at 258–60.
Id.
Id. at 259.
Adjin-Tettey, supra note 13, at 179–80.
Id. at 180.
Adjin-Tettey, supra note 13, at 181; Citron, supra note 17, at 90; Schulzke, supra note 1.
Adjin-Tettey, supra note 13, at 181.
Kim, supra note 43, at 1024.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1010.

01/14/2015 15:25:42

57.
note 7.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

35947-ckt_90-1 Sheet No. 134 Side B

sites.57 Revenge porn’s dissemination creates issues tort law fails to address
sufficiently: issues such as widespread reputational damage,58 repeated and
continual harassment,59 and potential endangerment of the victim.60
Reputation- and privacy-based torts fail to address many revenge porn
harms including sexually violent comments, derogatory statements about a
woman’s appearance, and threats of violence.61 One of the most significant
harms is “unwanted subjection to public scrutiny.”62 Lawsuits may increase
this harm by forcing the victim to suffer more humiliation through increased publicity.63 Harms from revenge porn are often “intangible and do
not always map onto traditional notions of tortious injury.”64 This is particularly true because privacy torts do not focus on the victim’s experience,
which is vital to many revenge porn harms.65 Like other torts, revenge porn
often has serious long-term consequences including loss of employment or
opportunity.66 However, tort law generally fails to cover its other long-term
psychological effects including reduced self-esteem, feeling unsafe, an
inability to “obtain education, [and] difficulties in maintaining employment
and interpersonal relationships.”67
Because revenge porn is visual, the harm may be particularly severe.
Images are memorable, and people believe pictures depict the truth.68 However, images frequently present only a portion of the story, as they can be
altered or presented out of context.69 Revenge porn “can also expose and
identify an individual in a way that mere words cannot, thus creating a
greater danger to privacy and security.”70 Revenge porn “injuries [are] in a
class by themselves” because it is so easy to disseminate revenge porn
quickly and because it is almost impossible to stop the spread of these images or delete them from every website on which they appear.71 The images
last indeterminately, and because websites are accessible internationally,
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the images can cause widespread reputational damage.72 Thus, there is no
comparison to harm in the real world.73
Victims of revenge porn may attempt to sue under tort claims like appropriation, defamation, public disclosure of private facts, or intentional
infliction of emotional distress, but frequently these claims fail.74 Appropriation claims fail because appropriation occurs when a defendant, for his
advantage, uses a “plaintiff’s name or likeness.”75 However, since “[i]t is
only when the publicity is given for the purpose of appropriating to the
defendant’s benefit the commercial or other values associated with the
name or the likeness that the right of privacy is invaded,”76 appropriation
suits only succeed when a commercial or extrinsic value is tied to the victim’s name or likeness.
Defamation is appropriate for untrue insults online, but statements of
opinion constitute a complete defense.77 Defamation protects the plaintiff’s
interests in his or her reputation.78 The plaintiff must show the defendant
made a false statement that harmed the plaintiff’s reputation.79 Allegations
of fornication are defamatory per se in several states, particularly when
fornication is a crime involving moral turpitude.80 So, a court could find
that revenge porn, since it relates to fornication, is defamatory per se.
However, because truth is a complete defense,81 revenge porn posters will
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72. Id.
73. Id.
74. GoDaddy.com, L.L.C. v. Toups, 429 S.W.3d 752 (Tex. App. 2014); Salter et al., supra note
18, at 305; Goode, supra note 4.
75. Matthews v. Wozencraft , 15 F.3d 432, 437 (5th Cir. 1994) (“One who appropriates to his
own use or benefit the name or likeness of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his
privacy.”) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C (1977)); Motschenbacher v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821, 824 (9th Cir. 1974).
76. Wozencraft, 15 F.3d at 437 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C, cmt. d
(1977)).
77. Bryson v. News Am. Publ’ns, Inc., 672 N.E.2d 1207, 1220 (Ill. 1996); Todd Love, Milkovich
v. Lorrain Journal Company: Rejection of the Constitutional Fact-Opinion Dichotomy in Defamation
Law, 36 S.D. L. REV. 764, 764–765 (1991) (“Milkovich did not remove all constitutional protection for
statements of opinion. Instead, it retained absolute constitutional protection for ‘pure opinion’ while
denying such protection for ‘mixed opinion.’”).
78. 53 C.J.S. Libel and Slander; Injurious Falsehood § 14 (2014).
79. Kolegas v. Heftel Broad. Corp., 607 N.E.2d 201, 206 (Ill. 1992); Krasinski v. United Parcel
Serv., Inc., 530 N.E.2d 468, 471 (Ill. 1988).
80. Van Horne v. Muller, 705 N.E.2d 898, 903 (Ill. 1998); Schivarelli v. CBS, Inc., 776 N.E.2d
693, 697 (Ill App. 1st Dist. 2002); Gorman v. Swaggart, 524 So. 2d 915 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1988),
writ denied, 530 So. 2d 575 (La. 1988).
81. Meiring de Villiers, Substantial Truth in Defamation Law, 32 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 91, 93
(2008) (“In a defamation action, the plaintiff must prove the falsity of the defamatory statement that
allegedly harmed her reputation, while the defendant may rely on its truthfulness as a defense. Although
absolute truth is a complete defense to a defamation charge, a defendant does not have to prove the
literal truth of a defamatory statement to prevail . . . . The substantial truth doctrine overlooks minor
inaccuracies and focuses upon the meaning conveyed by a publication. Under the doctrine, a publica-
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avoid liability by emphasizing since the victim is in the pictures, she committed the depicted acts. Thus, by attempting to defend themselves, victims
suffer the same harm the harassers intended in the first place: more publicity and further humiliation.82
Public disclosure of private facts suits frequently fail, even where the
plaintiff was underage.83 Public disclosure occurs where “the plaintiff
claims the right to be free from unwanted publicity about his private affairs,
which, although wholly true, would be offensive to a person of ordinary
sensibilities.”84 Public disclosure requires “a communication that reaches,
or is sure to reach, the public.”85 Disclosure includes dissemination to
newspapers, magazines, and the internet.86 Publicity may also include disclosure to those with “a special relationship with the plaintiff that makes
the disclosure as devastating as disclosure to the public at large.”87 However, disclosure is not actionable when it occurs to those “with a ‘natural and
proper interest.’”88 While a few courts have found liability for public disclosure where the defendant posted contact information and images on
numerous sites and “the photographs [we]re extremely graphic and of a
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tion would be substantially true, and thus First Amendment-protected, provided that it (a) is factually
similar to the pleaded truth, and (b) differs from the truth by no more than insubstantial details. A
statement differs from the truth ‘by no more than insubstantial details’ if the statement does not harm
the plaintiff’s reputation more than would the pleaded truth.”).
82. Franks, Unwilling Avatars, supra note 9, at 259.
83. Doe v. Peterson, 784 F. Supp. 2d 831, 834, 842–44 (E.D. Mich. 2011) (granting Defendants’
motion for summary judgment for public disclosure of private facts and intrusion upon seclusion, where
nude images of plaintiff, which she took for her boyfriend when she was 17, were distributed on several
websites.); but see Doe v. Hofstetter, No. 11-CV-02209-DME-MJW, 2012 WL 2319052 (D. Colo. June
13, 2012) (entering default judgment against defendant for intentional infliction of emotional distress,
and public disclosure of private facts when Defendant published private sexual photographs on the
internet.); Taylor v. Franko, No. 09-00002 JMS/RLP, 2011 WL 2746714, *2, *5 (D. Haw. July 12,
2011) (granting damages of $425,000 for public disclosure of private facts, negligent and intentional
infliction of emotional distress and defamation when Defendant posted contact information and images
on at least twenty-three “adult Websites without her consent the photographs are extremely graphic and
of a personal nature” particularly as “much of the information provided about her sexual preferences
were untrue”).
84. McNally v. Pulitzer Pub. Co., 532 F.2d 69, 78 (8th Cir. 1976) (“The generally recognized
elements of the tort of public disclosure of private facts are (1) the publication, (2) absent any waiver or
privilege, (3) of private matters in which the public has no legitimate concern, (4) such as to bring
shame or humiliation to a person of ordinary sensibilities.”).
85. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. a (1977).
86. Peterson, 784 F. Supp. 2d at 842 (“Despite the fact that websites do not actually circulate in
public like newspapers and magazines, their accessibility to anyone with access to the internet suggests
that their contents should be treated as even more “widely disclosed” than information or photos portrayed in traditional print materials.”); Tureen v. Equifax, Inc., 571 F.2d 411, 417–18 (8th Cir. 1978)
(“any publication in a newspaper or a magazine, even of small circulation, or in a handbill distributed to
a large number of persons, or any broadcast over the radio, or statement made in an address to a large
audience, is sufficient to give publicity”).
87. Karraker v. Rent-A-Center, Inc., 411 F.3d 831, 838 (7th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted).
88. Id.
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personal nature,”89 once the images were already in public, “the prevailing
law of invasion of privacy generally recognizes that the interests in privacy
fade.”90 So once the images are on the web, the victim has no recourse
against websites that repost the images because she has lost any privacy
interest in those images.
One major barricade to successful privacy suits revolves around consent to the image. Consent to sexual activity does not preclude an action for
surreptitious photography.91 However, consent to recording or photographing sexual acts in a private place does preclude invasion of privacy or
intentional infliction of emotional distress suits.92 Intentional infliction of
emotional distress requires “extreme and outrageous conduct intended to
cause severe emotional distress.”93 It further requires a “causal connection
between the plaintiff’s injury and the defendant’s conduct, with the harm
amounting to severe emotional distress to the plaintiff.”94 While this privacy tort seems a likely choice, and sometimes succeeds,95 courts are reluctant to permit intentional infliction claims due to concerns about too much
litigation and the ease of faking emotional distress.96 The general rule in the
Restatement is “there is no liability for pure ‘emotional distress, without
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89. Doe v. Hofstetter, No. 11-CV-02209-DME-MJW, 2012 WL 2319052, at *2 (D. Colo. June
13, 2012) (entering default judgment against defendant for intentional infliction of emotional distress,
and public disclosure of private facts when Defendant published private sexual photographs on the
internet.); Taylor v. Franko, No. 09-00002JMS/RLP, 2011 WL 2746714, at *2, *5 (D. Haw. July 12,
2011) (granting damages of $425,000 for public disclosure of private facts, negligent and intentional
infliction of emotional distress and defamation when Defendant posted contact information and images
on at least twenty-three “adult Websites without her consent the photographs are extremely graphic and
of a personal nature” particularly as “much of the information provided about her sexual preferences
were untrue”).
90. Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U. S. 469, 494–95 (1975).
91. Lewis v. LeGrow, 670 N.W.2d 675, 686 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003).
92. Id.
93. Elizabeth M. Jaffe, Cyberbullies Beware: Reconsidering Vosburg v. Putney in the Internet
Age, 5 CHARLESTON L. REV. 379, 391 (2011).
94. Id.
95. Doe v. Peterson, 784 F. Supp. 2d 831, 835, 842–44 (E.D. Mich. 2011) (denying Defendants’
motion for summary judgment with respect to intentional infliction of emotional distress where nude
images of plaintiff, which she took for her boyfriend when she was 17, were distributed on several
websites); but see Taylor v. Franko, CIV. 09-00002 JMS, 2011 WL 2746714, at *2, *5 (D. Haw. July
12, 2011) (granting damages of $425,000 for public disclosure of private facts, negligent and intentional
infliction of emotional distress and defamation when Defendant posted contact information and images
on at least twenty-three “adult Websites without her consent the photographs are extremely graphic and
of a personal nature” particularly as “much of the information provided about her sexual preferences
were untrue”); Doe v. Hofstetter, No. 11-CV-02209-DME-MJW, 2012 WL 2319052 (D. Colo. June 13,
2012) (entering default judgment against defendant for intentional infliction of emotional distress, and
public disclosure of private facts when Defendant published private sexual photographs on the internet.).
96. See generally Russell Fraker, Reformulating Outrage: A Critical Analysis of the Problematic
Tort of IIED, 61 VAND. L. REV. 983 (2008).
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resulting bodily harm or any other invasion of the [plaintiff’s] interests.’”97
Therefore, if the plaintiff cannot prove some harm beyond the harm to their
reputation or psyche, their claim is not cognizable. Because privacy torts
fail to protect victims against the initial posting or dissemination of revenge
porn, fail to address many of the unique harms of revenge porn, and fail to
remove the images from the web, privacy torts are an inadequate remedy.
2. Copyright Claims Fail to Protect the Victim From the Reputational
Harms Propagated by Revenge Porn

01/14/2015 15:25:42

97. Id. at 1005–06.
98. David Kluft, Revenge Porn: “Is Anyone Up” on Copyright Law?, TRADEMARK &
COPYRIGHT L. BLOG (Dec. 20, 2011),
http://www.trademarkandcopyrightlawblog.com/2011/12/revenge-porn-is-anyone-up-on-copyrightlaw/.
99. Id.
100. Id.; Laird, supra note 3 (“As for copyright law, if the photo was a self-portrait, the victim
owns the copyright.”); Matorin, supra note 7 (“Attempts to cast this as a copyright issue are absurd—
but it’s one of the only available legal avenues. It is not a good fit. She only owns the copyright if she
took the pictures herself; if her now ex-boyfriend/ex-husband did, he owns it.”).
101. Matorin, supra note 7.
102. Laird, supra note 3.
103. Bartow, supra note 5, at 44 (“‘Revenge Porn’ is pornography in which at least one of the
subjects was unaware that sexual acts were being fixed in a tangible medium of expression or was
unaware of or opposed to the work’s distribution, usually over the Internet.”)
104. Id. at 44–45, 48.
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Other civil claims fail to provide relief for revenge porn victims. Copyright claims provide one potential recourse, but the instances are so limited it is functionally useless.98 Under copyright law, reproduction and
publication rights require written permission from the copyright holder.99
However, a victim can only file a copyright claim if she took the picture or
video herself.100 Even if the victim took the images herself, she must register those images with the U.S. Copyright Office before she can request a
website to remove the photos or ask Google to remove them from its search
results.101 Victims frequently cannot obtain damages for copyright infringement because few victims register their copyrights and thus have no
standing to sue.102 The registration issue is exacerbated since many victims
are unaware the images were posted,103 and do not learn of their posting
within the requisite ninety days.
While in theory victims who took explicit images of themselves could
use copyright law to prevent others from publishing revenge porn, copyright law provides no relief for victims who did not take the images themselves or failed to register their copyright in the image.104 Even if victims
succeed in copyright claims, the suit only provides “a tiny bit of solace
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105. Id. at 45–46.
106. Franks, Why We Need a Response to Revenge Porn, supra note 40.
107. Bartow, supra note 5, at 19.
108. Id. at 45.
109. Laird, supra note 3 (“Copyright law fails to address dissemination and republication because
“[d]igital photos are easy to reproduce, so the original poster (or an angry site operator) can easily
resubmit photos to another site.”) (quoting revenge porn victim Rebekah Wells).
110. Id.; Ryan, supra note 1, at 363; Goode, supra note 4; Bedi, supra note 14; Mince-Didier,
supra note 7.
111. Matorin, supra note 7.
112. Kim, supra note 43, at 1034–35.
113. Clark-Flory, supra note 45.
114. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (1998) (“No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be
treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.”); Franks, Why We Need a Response to Revenge Porn, supra note 40 (Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act has been interpreted to grant website owners and operators far-ranging immunity
for tortious material submitted by third-party users).
115. Bartow, supra note 5, at 45.
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from the inability of their tormentors to fully commoditize revenge pornography.”105 Additionally, the expense, time and publicity issues facing victims who sue under a tort theory also apply to copyright suits.106
Copyright law has several other pitfalls as a revenge porn remedy.
Copyright law incentivizes the production and distribution of pornography
by protecting the producers’ copyright in the final product.107 Revenge porn
is popular and profitable, demonstrated by the number of websites dedicated to it, and “economic incentives fall in favor of [websites] allowing customers to upload and circulate anything they like, as broadly as they
choose.”108 While copyright suits can lead to an injunction against the
named sites, several websites frequently re-post the images.109 Therefore, it
is difficult, if not impossible, to remove photos from every website.110
Compounding this issue is the fact that even if a copyright suit forces
Google to remove the images from its search results, Google tells searchers
the image has been removed, but continues to provide a link to the images.111 Furthermore, as long as people see the pictures or know of their existence, revenge porn can have ramifications for years to come even if the
offending images eventually disappear from the web.
One possible solution to the problem of judgment-proof defendants is
to make website sponsors liable.112 However, internet service providers
have no legal obligation to identify or remove offensive posts or locate
revenge porn posters.113 The Communications Decency Act (CDA) grants
far-ranging immunity to website owners and operators for the posts of
third-party users and website subscribers114 and providers have no “legal
obligation to assist parties injured by online content in identifying the human wrongdoers who post damaging materials.”115 This commonly affects
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revenge porn victims.116 Revenge porn posters are anonymous, often requiring a court order to identify the poster for legal proceedings.117 If the
images are legally obscene, a CDA exception for obscenity may apply, but
only if the victim owns the copyright and the site ignored takedown notices. Otherwise, the CDA protects the sites because they are only “republishing user-submitted content.”118 Congress passed the CDA to protect
innocent internet service providers from liability for obscene material—but
now it “shield[s] websites that traffic in such content.”119
Many commentators argue revenge porn laws should “appl[y] to website operators who republish user submissions.”120 One federal district court
held “[t]he immunity afforded by the CDA is not absolute and may be for-

01/14/2015 15:25:42

Another potential solution is to require web sites obtain written consent from the subject of nude
images when the subject is identifiable, and keep that consent for a year following the image’s removal.
Id. at 1025. However, this alone likely will not deter posters, because of the ease of copying or forging
the victim’s signature for the consent form. Additionally, web site owners could institute waiting periods prior to permitting a post, which would give the poster a chance to rethink his comment, and require
a longer waiting period for sites more likely to cause harm. Id. at 1017. Prominently posted notices
regarding the potential legal ramifications of user-uploaded comments might also deter posters from
publishing damaging messages. Id.
119. Nancy Kim, Imposing Tort Liability on Websites for Cyber-Harassment, 118 YALE L.J.
POCKET PART 115, 116 (2008), http://thepocketpart.org/2008/12/15/kim.html.
120. Eric Goldman, California’s New Law Shows It’s Not Easy To Regulate Revenge Porn,
FORBES (Oct. 8, 2013, 12:03 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ericgoldman/2013/10/08/californiasnew-law-shows-its-not-easy-to-regulate-revenge-porn/ [hereinafter Goldman, It’s Not Easy to Regulate
Revenge Porn].
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116. See generally Goldman, What Should We Do, supra note 5.
117. Clark-Flory, supra note 45.
118. Laird, supra note 3 (quoting Eric Goldman, law professor at Santa Clara University). Although altering the scope of the CDA is beyond the scope of this article, some pertinent changes may
help solve the problem of judgment-free defendants in the internet context. Commentators argue Congress should “grant people the right to have their photos removed.” Andrews, supra note 47. Because
websites benefit from online traffic, they can best prevent harm caused by revenge porn, and thus courts
should hold sites to a reasonable care standard to protect victims from foreseeable harm caused by
online harassment. Kim, supra note 119, at 117. This reasonable care should include user guidelines,
user controls, report abuse buttons, and consequences such as “strip[ping] or threaten[ing] to strip a
harasser of anonymity,” or expulsion of abusive posters. Id. Websites should reasonably respond to
requests to remove revenge porn. Id. Courts often hold proprietors liable for nonphysical harm caused
by third parties including invasion of privacy. Id. at 118. Another potential solution is to make website
sponsors and owners liable under a proprietorship theory. Kim, supra note 43, at 1034–35. Website
owners are proprietors because they both control and receive benefit from their sites. Id. Their duty may
be higher than proprietors of real-world businesses because millions may visit their site each week, a
virtual impossibility in the real world. Id. at 1039. Proprietorship liability for web site sponsors “deters
antisocial conduct and compensates those injured by such conduct. It allocates the risk of injury to the
party in the best position to avoid its occurrence and absorb the loss.” Id.at 1045.
Web site owners and sponsors could make several changes to help curb revenge porn. They
could require posters to register prior to posting comments, require users indemnify sponsors from harm
caused by the users, and ban offensive posters. Id. at 1015–16. Requiring sponsors to remove “digital
image[s] of a naked person” when the victim so requests should be a requirement, but it will not help
victims when the images are already circulating broadly on other sites. Id. at 1023.
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feited if the site owner invites the posting of illegal materials or makes
actionable postings itself.”121 However, until all the circuits adopt this reasoning, and until every state criminalizes revenge porn, the materials will
remain legal. For instance, one class action lawsuit against a web site dedicated to revenge porn failed because of CDA protections.122 The court reasoned this protection covers material posted of an “alleged obscene or
unlawful nature.”123
Tort and copyright actions almost certainly will not prevent revenge
porn when the defendant is judgment-proof and therefore unconcerned
about his liability. Copyright law requires a victim take the image and register her copyright within 90 days of first publication. Removing the images from one website does not remove them from the internet, thus copyright
claims provide insufficient relief to revenge porn victims. As neither privacy torts nor copyright law successfully removes revenge porn images or
deters it in the first instance, a more effective deterrent is necessary.
B. Criminalizing Revenge Porn is the Best and Perhaps Only Way To
Provide a Much-Needed Deterrent

01/14/2015 15:25:42

121. Jones v. Dirty World Entm’t Recordings, L.L.C., 766 F. Supp. 2d 828, 836 (E.D. Ky. 2011)
(citing Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, L.L.C., 521 F.3d 1157 (9th
Cir. 2008) (en banc).
122. GoDaddy.com, L.L.C. v. Toups, 429 S.W.3d 752, 762 (Tex. App. 2014) (“Plaintiffs seek to
hold GoDaddy liable as the publisher of the contested website content; therefore, plaintiffs’ claims are
barred under 47 U.S.C. § 230”).
123. Id. at 760–61.
124. Brush, supra note 48 (quoting University of Miami School of Law professor, Mary Anne
Franks, “who is working with lawmakers in various states to push similar legislation.”).
125. Nannette Miranda, State Senate Committee Seeks New Law on ‘Revenge Porn’, ABC 30 (June
4, 2013), http://abclocal.go.com/kfsn/story?section=news/state&id=9127761 (quoting State Senator,
Anthony Cannella).
126. Clark-Flory, supra note 45.
127. Miranda, supra note 125 (quoting State Senator, Anthony Cannella).
128. Anita L. Allen, First Amendment Privacy and the Battle for Progressively Liberal Social
Change, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 885, 913 (2012) [hereinafter Allen, Privacy Jurisprudence as an In-
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A criminal deterrent is vital as disseminating revenge porn becomes
increasingly easy and hundreds of websites monetize it.124 Because civil
law does not carry the same social stigma as criminal law, it is not a successful deterrent.125 Many perpetrators have nothing to lose, so they are not
concerned about a civil judgment.126 However, revenge porn perpetrators
likely do not want to be imprisoned;127 so, legal scholars, legislators and
advocates are pushing to criminalize revenge porn. In 2014, nine states
enacted legislation and twenty-seven have pending legislation prohibiting
revenge porn.128 One state lawmaker explained legislation was necessary to
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help law enforcement combat revenge porn because “[c]urrently, there are
zero ramifications for someone who distributes revenge porn.”129 Another
highlighted the need to punish “harassment and the worst type of cyberbullying.”130
Criminal law “protect[s] the public against harm[] by punishing harmful results of conduct”131 and carries the imprimatur of community condemnation.132 Criminal convictions carry “an ineradicable connotation of
moral condemnation and personal guilt.”133 Additionally, criminal law is
essential to creating a “good society” because it “defines the minimum
conditions of man’s responsibility to his fellows and holds him to that responsibility.”134 Criminal law incentivizes obedience to the law—the threat
of punishment deters those who might engage in criminal activities.135 The
likelihood of a criminal conviction is a cost placed on committing a
crime.136 If a person considering posting revenge porn weighs the potential
costs against the potential gains, he could find facing criminal punishment
outweighs his desire to harass or humiliate his former paramour. While
nothing will completely deter revenge porn, just as the illegality of rape or
sexual assault or child pornography does not completely deter those
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strument of Social Change] (“Legal scholars now recognize ‘the offensive Internet’ as a major problem,
worthy of . . . legal reforms.”); Goode, supra note 4; Paul Samakow, Revenge Porn Now Illegal in CA:
Punish Criminals who Violate Trust, WASH. TIMES (Oct. 7, 2013),
http://communities.washingtontimes.com/neighborhood/leading-edge-legal-advice-everydaymatters/2013/oct/6/revenge-porn-now-illegal-ca-trust-violations-need-/ (“Criminal prosecution and
punishment are needed in addition to lawsuits.”); Jessica Roy, Proposed Florida Law Would Make
Publishing Revenge Porn Without Victim’s Consent a Third-Degree Felon, BETA BEAT (Mar. 8, 2013),
http://betabeat.com/2013/03/proposed-florida-law-would-make-publishing-revenge-porn-withoutvictims-consent-a-third-degree-felony/ (“A law like [the one proposed in Florida] could provide muchneeded recourse for victims of revenge porn, many of whom have difficulty finding lawyers willing to
take on their cases.”); State ‘Revenge Porn’ Legislation, supra note 31.
129. Bill that Would Criminalize ‘Revenge Porn’ Advances in Legislature, ROCK RIVER TIMES,
Mar. 31, 2014, http://rockrivertimes.com/2014/03/31/bill-that-would-criminalize-revenge-pornadvances-in-legislature/ (quoting Representative Joe Sosnowski).
130. Maura Zurick, Revenge Porn Ban Introduced in Springfield: Measure Would Make Posting
Explicit Pics Online Without Subject’s Permission a Felony, CHI. TRIB. (Jan. 29, 2014),
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2014-01-29/news/ct-illinois-revenge-porn-ban-talk-012920140129_1_revenge-such-content-permission (quoting co-sponsor Senator Michael Hastings).
131. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 1.3(b) (2d ed. 2013).
132. Henry M. Hart Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 404
(1958) (“What distinguishes a criminal from a civil sanction and all that distinguishes it, it is ventured,
is the judgment of community condemnation which accompanies and justifies its imposition.”).
133. Id. at 424.
134. Id. at 410.
135. Marcelo Ferrante, Deterrence and Crime Results, 10 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 1, 7 (2007).
136. Id. at 4–5.
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crimes,137 criminal punishment may be an effective deterrent because offenders are often judgment-proof but fear imprisonment.
Deterrence removes the motivation for criminal conduct; its true value
is shaping the public’s future conduct.138 Legal experts agree criminal penalties deter crimes.139 Two primary aims of criminal law are preventing and
deterring social wrongs; it prevents and punishes harm to society.140 Revenge porn harms society in three main ways. First, it harms the economy.
Second, it undermines societal norms and changes the dynamics of interpersonal interactions. Third, it is often a crime or leads to criminal activity.
1. Revenge Porn Harms Society Because it Harms the Economy
Revenge porn harms the economy by removing its victims from the
job market, making them unemployable,141 and harming their opportunities
for self-improvement by potentially preventing them from receiving higher
education that could lead to more lucrative employment.142 Further, it causes psychological issues that are costly to society.143
Unemployment has many costs, both economic and social. Its economic costs include loss of productivity, increased welfare recipients, and
lower tax revenues.144 The social costs of unemployment include “poverty,
poor health and premature mortality, psychological stress and suicide,
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137. Samakow, supra note 128 (“Criminal punishment will not be a perfect deterrent to every jerk
considering posting photographs of his or her partner to the world. Criminal punishment will not erase
the psychological torture a victim suffers, nor will it prevent the suicide of some victims. Nonetheless,
laws must be adopted to address this criminal behavior because one of the goals of criminal laws is
deterrence. Consequences can have a connection to behavior. If you know there are no consequences to
posting nude photos of your ex on a website, or in sending them to your entire email contacts list, you
are more likely to do so than if you know that doing so could land you in jail and paste you as a criminal for life.”).
138. Frank G. Carrington, Deterrence, Death, and the Victims of Crime: A Common Sense Approach, 35 VAND. L. REV. 587, 588 (1982).
139. Brush, supra note 48 (“according to [Stetson Law professor Catherine J.] Cameron and
others”).
140. Samakow, supra note 128 (“Volumes have been written about the purpose and effectiveness
of criminal laws. We are a society of laws. Laws sustain us and guide us. Laws draw lines. When those
lines are crossed there must be consequences. While laws cannot prevent all criminal actions, without
the laws society would perish.”).
141. Laird, supra note 3; Goode, supra note 4 (“It’s just an easy way to make people unemployable, undatable and potentially at physical risk,” quoting Danielle Citron).
142. Ryan, supra note 1, at 364.
143. Richardson, supra note 1, at 158–59.
144. Tony Eardley, Identifying and Quantifying the Costs of Unemployment, in THE PRICE OF
PROSPERITY: THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COSTS OF UNEMPLOYMENT 44 (Richard Taylor & Peter
Saunders eds., 2002) (“the loss of productive output, forgone revenue, budgetary costs arising from
unemployment insurance or welfare provision, and estimates of individual financial losses resulting
from prolonged employment.”).
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criminal behaviour, [and] loss of human capital.”145 The government loses
revenue as people cannot work, and it must spend more money to assist the
unemployed.146 Victims of revenge porn suffer psychological harm, which
leads to increased societal costs of caring for these individuals.147 Those
victims who lose their jobs suffer long-term losses from unemployment
including decreased skills, which in turn further harm the country’s economic productivity eventually leading “to less aggregate wealth.”148
2. Revenge Porn Harms the Public by Undermining Societal Norms
and Changing the Dynamics of Interpersonal Interactions
Revenge porn harms society by undermining community norms and
changing interpersonal interactions that make “intimacy difficult, if not
impossible.”149 Failing to take a strong stand by criminalizing revenge porn
“encourages . . . society to cultivate insensitivity and apathy as a norm, and
to shun mutual respect and civility as core values. Inaction . . . reinforces a
standard of conduct that would be intolerable in the physical world.”150
Revenge porn sites “devoted . . . to demeaning, harassing and humiliating
individuals . . . surely threaten . . . the ‘moral ecology’ of society.”151
Criminalizing revenge porn “would deter damaging privacy invasions
and send the powerful message that posting someone’s most private mo-
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145. Id.
146. J.T. Young, The Ripple Effect of High Unemployment: When Workers Suffer, so does the
Nation as a Whole, WASH. TIMES, May 14, 2013,
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/may/14/the-ripple-effect-of-highunemployment/#ixzz2hibXL081.
147. Mental Illness Surveillance Among Adults in the United States, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL
(Sept. 2, 2011),
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/su6003a1.htm (“In 2002 and 2003, mental illness cost
the United States an estimated $300 billion annually, which included approximately $193 billion from
lost earnings and wages and $24 billion in disability benefits in 2002 and $100 billion in health-care
expenditures in 2003.”).
148. Long-Term Unemployment: Consequences and Solutions: Testimony Before the Joint Economic Commission (Apr. 24, 2013) (statement of Kevin A. Hassett, John G. Searle Senior Fellow,
Director of Economic Policy Studies, American Enterprise Institute), available at
http://www.policyuncertainty.com/app/Hasset_testimony.pdf (“unemployment has an influence on the
risk of future unemployment and earnings of a worker, effects that may partially be attributable to both
employers’ perceptions of workers and to workers’ loss of general and specific skills during a period of
unemployment.”); Young, supra note 146 (“As the Congressional Budget Office’s 2012 study observed, many displaced workers lose earnings upon unemployment but ‘also often suffer long-term
losses in earnings from a combination of factors.’”).
149. Adjin-Tettey, supra note 13, at 192 (discussing “the resulting human and social costs” of
sexual victimization); Kim, supra note 43, at 1051.
150. Kim, supra note 43, at 1054.
151. Allen, Privacy Jurisprudence as an Instrument of Social Change, supra note 128, at 915.
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ments, most often in a breach of their trust and without their permission, is
unacceptable.”152
3. Revenge Porn Harms Society Because it is Often a Separate Crime
or Leads to Criminal Activity
Revenge porn constitutes “sexual use without consent.”153 Other kinds
of sexual use without consent, such as rape or sexual assault, are prosecuted “even if the perpetrator never touches the victim.”154 Revenge porn may
constitute sexual exploitation, because the victim is used in “pornography,
or other sexually manipulative activity that has caused or could cause serious emotional injury.”155 Revenge porn “transforms unwilling individuals
into sexual entertainment for strangers.”156 Moreover, revenge porn subjects victims to danger beyond humiliation. Victims frequently receive
threats of sexual assault, rape and death.157 Victims may commit suicide:
they are stalked, harassed, assaulted and sometimes even killed.158 Where it
involves computer fraud or hacking, the perpetrators violate the Computer
Fraud and Abuse Act,159 but without more posting the images is not a
crime.160 While some instances of revenge porn constitute existing crimes,
the protections are far from complete.161 In many instances, the age of the
victim precludes damages.162 The law already recognizes several crimes for
possession, creation or distribution of harmful images and for sexual use
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152. Danielle Keats Citron, ‘Revenge Porn’ Should be a Crime, CNN (Jan. 16, 2014, 3:49 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2013/08/29/opinion/citron-revenge-porn/index.html.
153. Franks, Why We Need a Response to Revenge Porn, supra note 40.
154. Id.
155. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1498–99 (9th ed. 2009).
156. Franks, A Quick Guide, supra note 8, at 1.
157. Logan Reputation, New York Bans Revenge Porn Website, INTERNETREPUTATION.COM (Oct.
18, 2013), http://www.internetreputation.com/new-york-bans-revenge-porn-website/.
158. Franks, Unwilling Avatars, supra note 9, at 246; Salter et al., supra note 18, at 303; Franks, A
Quick Guide, supra note 8, at 1; Schulzke, supra note 1.
159. Kashmir Hill, How Revenge Porn King Hunter Moore Was Taken Down, FORBES (Jan. 24,
2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2014/01/24/how-revenge-porn-king-hunter-moore-wastaken-down/ (Hunter Moore, owner of sites that post revenge porn “was arrested along with Chris ‘Gary
Jones’ Evens and charged with hacking and conspiracy to hack.”).
160. People v. Barber, No. 2013NY059761, 2014 WL 641316 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. Feb. 18, 2014)
(granting a motion to dismiss a criminal case filed against a revenge porn perpetrator charged with
Aggravated Harassment, Dissemination of an Unlawful Surveillance Image and Public Display of
Offensive Sexual Material reasoning “defendant’s conduct, while reprehensible, does not violate any of
the criminal statutes under which he is charged.”).
161. Laird, supra note 3 (In many states, Johnstone says, nonconsensual pornography violates the
state criminal laws on stalking, voyeurism, hacking and more. But the police are used to ‘brick-andmortar crime scenes,’ Johnstone says, and may not think to apply those laws to online behavior.”)
(quoting Erica Johnstone; also references Jody Westby, Chair of the Privacy and Computer Crime
Committee of the ABA’s Science & Technology Law Section); Matorin, supra note 7.
162. Franks, Why We Need a Response to Revenge Porn, supra note 40.
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without consent.163 So far only one state has attempted to prosecute a revenge porn poster—unsuccessfully164—thus “involuntary porn falls between the cracks because it is new.”165
Revenge porn imposes a high cost on society, and criminal penalties
are “the most effective deterrent.”166 Since criminal cases do not cost victims thousands of dollars they do not have,167 criminalizing revenge porn
allows those who are unable to pay the same opportunity to stop revenge
porn as those with means.168 Preventing victimization so there need be no
compensation is another primary goal of criminal law.169 New laws criminalizing revenge porn are “necessary because existing laws do not apply.”170 Furthermore, because the images are almost impossible to remove,
criminalizing revenge porn to deter its initial posting is “the best possible
outcome.”171 Criminal laws would deter revenge porn and prevent victimization.
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163. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1188 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “sexual offense” as “[a]n offense
involving unlawful sexual conduct, such as prostitution, indecent exposure, incest, pederasty, and
bestiality”); id.at 1498–99 (defining “sexual exploitation” as “[t]he use of a person, esp. a child, in
prostitution, pornography, or other sexually manipulative activity that has caused or could cause serious
emotional injury”); id. at 1279 (defining “child pornography” as “[m]aterial depicting a person under
the age of 18 engaged in sexual activity . . . those directly involved in its distribution can be criminally
punished.”).
164. Barber, 2014 WL 641316 (dismissing all counts filed against a revenge porn perpetrator
charged with Aggravated Harassment, Dissemination of an Unlawful Surveillance Image and Public
Display of Offensive Sexual Material reasoning “defendant’s conduct, while reprehensible, does not
violate any of the criminal statutes under which he is charged.”).
165. Matorin, supra note 7.
166. Franks, A Quick Guide, supra note 8, at 1.
167. Laird, supra note 3 (criminalizing revenge porn “have the financial and privacy concerns of
lawsuits, and the laws would provide quick takedowns rather than financial damages.”); Brush, supra
note 48 (“Moreover, criminal cases don’t cost the complainant untold thousands of dollars”) (citing
Alan L. Friel).
168. Brush, supra note 48 (“The big difference is the expense. If you don’t have the financial
resources to bring a civil claim, it’s not really a remedy. A criminal statute levels the playing field for
economically disadvantaged victims . . . .”) (citing Edwards Wildman Palmer, LLP media and technology partner, Alan L. Friel).
169. Carrington, supra note 138, at 587.
170. Matorin, supra note 7; see Sam Jasenosky, Revenge-Porn Laws Needed: There is Currently
No State Law Protecting Victims of Revenge Porn, MINN. DAILY, Oct. 22, 2013,
http://www.mndaily.com/opinion/columns/2013/10/07/revenge-porn-laws-needed (“With the rise of
revenge porn websites, we can’t allow loopholes in our cyber-bullying laws to leave victims without
protection.”).
171. Jasenosky, supra note 170 (“Our laws should reflect critical thinking on the way technology
is mediating our relationships. A federal law should be our goal, but state laws are where we can start.
There must be consequences of cruelly exploiting people through revenge porn.”); Heather Kelly, New
California ‘Revenge Porn’ Law May Miss Some Victims, CNN (Oct. 3, 2013),
http://www.cnn.com/2013/10/03/tech/web/revenge-porn-law-california/.
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II. AN ANALYSIS OF SOME LAWS THAT CRIMINALIZE REVENGE PORN
Most states do not prohibit posting another’s image or personal information online without permission.172 During the past two years, ten states
enacted legislation, and legislators in at least twenty-seven states introduced bills.173 However, two fail to cover the vast majority of victims: one
only protects victims who were unaware someone captured the images; the
other does not protect victims who took the image themselves.174 Due to
the ease of taking and posting nude pictures, the fact that just ten states
have criminalized revenge porn “highlights how poorly legislation has kept
up with technological advances.”175
New Jersey passed a law in 2003 that makes it a third-degree felony to
disseminate a sexually explicit picture of someone without her consent.176
While legislators did not discuss revenge porn, as it was unheard of 11
years ago, the statute is “fairly comprehensive.”177 Since then, it appears
other states may have utilized this statute as a basis for their own laws
criminalizing revenge porn. New Jersey’s statute expresses “the idea that
the exposure of [the victim’s] ‘intimate parts’ or ‘sexual contacts’ is inherently intrusive.”178 Some advocates feel New Jersey’s law is a prime example of how to criminalize revenge porn.179 Some even argue that, although
it was not directed at revenge porn, it more successfully holds posters responsible than other statutes.180
Laws criminalizing revenge porn typically prohibit dissemination
without consent, but fail to define consent fully.181 They further require the
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172. Mince-Didier, supra note 7.
173. State ‘Revenge Porn’ Legislation, supra note 31.
174. CAL. PENAL CODE § 647 (West 2013) (“Any person who photographs or records by any
means the image of the intimate body part or parts of another identifiable person, under circumstances
where the parties agree or understand that the image shall remain private, and the person subsequently
distributes the image taken, with the intent to cause serious emotional distress, and the depicted person
suffers serious emotional distress.”); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 942.09 (West 2014).
175. Jasenosky, supra note 170.
176. NJ STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-9(b) (West 2003), available at
https://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/criminal/charges/sexual014.pdf.
177. Franks, A Quick Guide, supra note 8, at 1.
178. Andrew Gilden, Cyberbullying and the Innocence Narrative, 48 HARV. C.R.-C.L. REV. 357,
383–84 (2013).
179. Franks, Why We Need a Response to Revenge Porn, supra note 40.
180. Jasenosky, supra note 170.
181. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1425 (2014) (West) (“It is unlawful to intentionally disclose,
display, distribute, publish, advertise or offer a photograph, videotape, film or digital recording of
another person in a state of nudity or engaged in specific sexual activities if the person knows or should
have known that the depicted person has not consented to the disclosure.”); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 18-7-107 (West 2014); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-90 (West 2014); HAW. REV. STAT. § 711-1110.9
(West 2014); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-6609 (West 2014); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5b-203 (West 2014);
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-386.1 (West 2014).
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intent to harass or cause emotional distress.182 Revenge porn’s dissemination on websites is prohibited, and the laws immunize websites from liability.183 One law criminalizes the possession, distribution, exhibition or rereproduction of a nude image if the subject did not consent, but this only
applies when the subject is unaware the image was captured.184 This fails to
protect victims who took the images themselves, and may criminalize too
much speech because courts have long protected the private possession of
pornography.185 So long as the law sufficiently explains that the only possession it criminalizes are sexually explicit or nude images the victim was
unaware were taken, it can likely meet constitutional scrutiny. Laws criminalizing revenge porn also provide exceptions for commercial and lawful
purposes.186 Many of the laws do not require the subject be identified or
identifiable.187 This could make the laws overly broad by criminalizing a
victimless act, as the harms of revenge porn are tied primarily to others
knowing the subject’s identity.
Concerning penalties, there is a split regarding whether revenge porn
constitutes a misdemeanor or a felony.188 One law provides for more severe
punishment when there are aggravating factors, such as when the victim is
less than 18 years of age.189 Three other laws raise the punishment for second violations—one law makes a subsequent violation a felony punishable
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182. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-7-107 (West 2014); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-90 (WEST 2014);
HAW. REV. STAT. § 711-1110.9 (West 2014); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-6609 (West 2014); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 76-5b-203 (West 2014).
183. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-7-107 (West 2014); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-6609 (West 2014);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5b-203 (West 2014) (“This section does not apply to an Internet service provider or interactive computer service, as defined in 47 U.S.C. Sec. 230(f)(2), a provider of an electronic
communications service as defined in 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2510, a telecommunications service, information
service, or mobile service as defined in 47 U.S.C. Sec. 153, including a commercial mobile service as
defined in 47 U.S.C. Sec. 332(d), or a cable operator as defined in 47 U.S.C. Sec. 522”).
184. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 942.09 (West 2014) (“does not know of and consent to the capture of the
representation”).
185. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969).
186. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1425 (2014) (West); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-90 (West 2014);
HAW. REV. STAT. § 711-1110.9 (West 2014); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5b-203 (West 2014); VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-386.1 (West 2014); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 942.09 (West 2014).
187. The following require identification: CAL. PENAL CODE § 647 (West 2013); COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 18-7-107 (West 2014); HAW. REV. STAT. § 711-1110.9 (West 2014). The following
statutes do not require the subject be identified or identifiable: ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1425 (2014)
(West); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-90 (West 2014); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-6609 (West 2014); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 76-5b-203 (West 2014).
188. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-7-107 (West 2014) (misdemeanor punishable by between six
and eighteen months in prison and “the court shall fine the defendant up to ten thousand dollars.”);
HAW. REV. STAT. § 711-1110.9 (West 2014) (felony carry a maximum possible penalty of 5 years in
prison); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-6609 (West 2014); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 942.09 (West 2014) (misdemeanor punishable by “a fine not to exceed $10,000 or imprisonment not to exceed 9 months, or
both.”).
189. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-386.1 (West 2014).
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“by imprisonment of not less than one nor more than five years, a fine of
not more than $100,000.00, or both.”190 Colorado’s law further protects
victims by creating a private cause of action.191 It also ensures victims “retain a protectable right of authorship regarding the commercial use of the
private image,” thereby protecting the victim’s right to sue under copyright
as well as require websites to remove the images.192
Current and proposed laws criminalizing revenge porn do not address
its true harms. These laws fail to remove the photos from the web, either
from the site on which they were initially posted or the re-postings on
“dozens or even hundreds of other Web sites.”193 Congressional action is
the only way to remedy this issue because the CDA grants broad immunity
to internet service providers for the acts of private parties.194
One potential solution appears in Hawaii’s revenge porn statute,
which provides “the court may order the destruction of any recording made
in violation of this section.”195 This law also expressly protects websites
from liability.196 Assuming the destruction of the images imposes a duty on
websites to remove those images without imposing liability because they
were posted on the site, this solution would remove the images from the
web but continue to protect websites and thus not violate the CDA. Since
criminal laws provide effective deterrents, criminalizing revenge porn
would drastically reduce the need to remove the images in the first place.
The concerns regarding laws criminalizing revenge porn include that they:
(1) inadequately protect victims and are insufficient in several common
instances of revenge porn; and (2) impermissibly infringe upon free speech.
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190. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-90 (West 2014); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5b-203 (West 2014) (“Distribution of an intimate image is a third degree felony on a second or subsequent conviction for an
offense under this section that arises from a separate criminal episode”); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-386.1
(West 2014) (“Where it is alleged in the warrant, information, or indictment on which the person is
convicted and found by the court or jury trying the case that the person has previously been convicted
within the 10-year period immediately preceding the offense charged of two or more of the offenses
specified in this section, each such offense occurring on a different date, and when such offenses were
not part of a common act, transaction, or scheme, and such person has been at liberty as defined in §
53.1-151 between each conviction, he shall be guilty of a Class 6 felony.”).
191. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-7-107 (West 2014).
192. Id.
193. Andrews, supra note 47.
194. Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1105, 1109 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that where a
woman alleged her former boyfriend created fake profiles under her name on Yahoo, posted nude
photos and provided her contact information, impersonated her in chat rooms and directed people to her
fake profiles Yahoo! was immune under Section 230, but could be liable on a promissory estoppel
theory because it promised to take down the content but did not.); Andrews, supra note 47.
195. HAW. REV. STAT. § 711-1110.9 (West 2014).
196. Id.
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A. The Laws Inadequately Protect Victims and Are Insufficient in
Several Common Instances of Revenge Porn
The laws criminalizing revenge porn are insufficient. Some are inadequate because they are not applicable in several common instances of revenge porn.197 Some state laws miss the issue entirely by applying only
when the perpetrator took the image and knew the subject did not consent.198 Others do not require the victim be identified or identifiable.199
These laws do not protect the vast majority of victims because most laws
do not apply when victims took the picture themselves; almost eighty percent of revenge porn victims took the picture themselves.200 Because these
laws do not cover most victims, particularly those who took the images
themselves, they may promote a “‘blame the victim’ mentality.”201
Jurisdiction is another potential issue, simply because of the ease of
posting revenge porn from anywhere at any time. States can prosecute outof-state defendants who harm its residents.202 Laws criminalizing revenge
porn should address jurisdiction so perpetrators cannot avoid liability by
posting the images from a state where the victim does not reside. To this
end, legislators should utilize the detrimental effects test first defined by
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes.203 The detrimental effects test states “[a]cts
done outside a jurisdiction, but intended to produce and producing detrimental effects within it, justify a state in punishing the cause of the harm as
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197. Bedi, supra note 14 (quoting Mary Anne Franks); Schulzke, supra note 1 (quoting Eugene
Volokh).
198. CAL. PENAL CODE § 647 (West 2013) (applies when the perpetrator takes the image prior to
distribution.); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-386.1 (West 2014) (applies when the perpetrator “knowingly and
intentionally create[s] any videographic or still image by any means whatsoever of any nonconsenting
person”); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 942.09 (West 2014) (felony violation only applies when the defendant
“knows or has reason to know that the person who is depicted nude does not know of and consent to the
capture of the representation.”).
199. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1425 (2014) (West); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-90 (West 2014);
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-6609 (West 2014); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5b-203 (West 2014).
200. CAL. PENAL CODE § 647 (West 2013); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 942.09 (West 2014); Bedi, supra
note 14; Goldman, It’s Not Easy To Regulate Revenge Porn, supra note 120.
201. Kelly, supra note 171 (quoting Mary Anne Franks).
202. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789 (1984) (holding a court may exercise specific personal
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant acting outside the forum when the defendant intentionally
directed tortious conduct toward the state, knowing the conduct would harm a resident of the forum);
Carefirst of Md., Inc. v. Carefirst Pregnancy Ctrs., Inc., 334 F.3d 390, 397-98 (4th Cir. 2003) (“To
decide whether the requisites of specific jurisdiction are satisfied in this case, it is necessary to consider
how they apply to the particular circumstance in which, as here, an out-of-state defendant has acted
outside of the forum in a manner that injures someone residing in the forum.”).
203. Calder, 465 U.S. at 789 (“Jurisdiction over petitioners is therefore proper in California based
on the ‘effects’ of their Florida conduct in California.”) (citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297–298 (1980)); Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 285 (1911);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAW § 37 (2014).
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204. Strassheim, 221 U.S. at 285.
205. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-90 (West 2014).
206. Goldman, It’s Not Easy To Regulate Revenge Porn, supra note 120.
207. H.R. 260, 147th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Del. 2014).
208. CAL. PENAL CODE § 647 (West 2013) (applies when the perpetrator takes the image prior to
distribution); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-386.1 (West 2014) (applies when the perpetrator “knowingly and
intentionally create[s] any videographic or still image by any means whatsoever of any nonconsenting
person.”); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 942.09 (West 2014) (applies when the defendant “knows or has reason to
know that the person who is depicted nude does not know of and consent to the capture of the representation.”); Goldman, It’s Not Easy To Regulate Revenge Porn, supra note 120.
209. H.R. 260.
210. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-7-107 (West 2014) (“When the actor knew or should have
known that the depicted person had a reasonable expectation that the image would remain private”);
HAW. REV. STAT. § 711-1110.9 (West 2014) (“The person intentionally or knowingly installs or uses,
or both, in any private place, without consent of the person or persons entitled to privacy therein, any
device for observing, recording, amplifying, or broadcasting another person in a stage of undress or
sexual activity in that place”); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-6609 (West 2014) (“A place where a reasonable
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if he had been present at the effect.”204 Because revenge porn foreseeably
harms the victim in the state in which she lives, laws criminalizing revenge
porn should incorporate language from the detrimental effects test into the
statute. An example of incorporating the detrimental effects test appears in
Georgia’s revenge porn law which subjects individuals to prosecution for
activities conducted “within or outside of this state” if that conduct “involves an individual who resides in [Georgia]” unless the person is within
the state, in which case the violation need not affect an individual residing
inside the state.205
Another reason these laws are inadequate is they almost never criminalize the redistribution of the images, just the original posting.206 This
leaves victims unable to remove the images, one of the results they most
desire. All but one law fails to protect victims when the perpetrator hacks
into the victim’s computer or steals the images some other way.207 Although these actions are prohibited by other statutes under which the perpetrators may be liable, failing to expressly criminalize the dissemination of
images obtained illegally provides a potential loophole regarding revenge
porn particularly as many only prohibit the dissemination of images the
poster either took or received from another person.208 One proposed Delaware law that is awaiting signature expressly prohibits revenge porn when
the perpetrator obtained the images through theft, “unauthorized access to a
computer system . . . or by unauthorized access to electronic mail or an
electronic mail service provider.”209 This closes the potential loophole.
Some revenge porn laws include language addressing a reasonable expectation of privacy, but none creates a right to privacy based on the context of an intimate relationship or a right to privacy regarding sexually
explicit images.210 One’s definition of a reasonable expectation of privacy
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turns on the location where the images were captured.211 These statutes fail
to address how prosecutors could prove the parties agreed the images
would remain private,212 creating further obstacles to successful prosecution by severely limiting the number of victims who could prove the defendant knew the victim intended the images remain confidential. These
laws also fail to address confidentiality disputes that may arise when the
parties agree the image will stay private.213
These laws require intent to cause severe emotional distress or harass
the victim. Some commentators argue emotional distress is not a sufficient
reason to criminalize revenge porn.214 Emotional distress does not fully
encompass common harms such as reputational harm, harassment, or physical endangerment.215 Intent is generally difficult to prove.216 Laws that
only apply when the defendant intends to cause severe emotional distress
may be exceedingly difficult to prove without a “smoking gun.”217 This is
particularly true of revenge porn because there are a multitude of potential
motivations behind sharing intimate photos including increasing website
traffic, obtaining notoriety,218 or for “bragging rights, compensation or as a
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person would believe that he could undress, be undressed or engage in sexual activity in privacy, without concern that he is being viewed, photographed, filmed or otherwise recorded by an imaging device”); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5b-203 (West 2014) (“the intimate image was created by or provided to
the actor under circumstances in which the individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy”); VA.
CODE ANN. § 18.2-386.1 (West 2014) (“when the circumstances set forth in clause (i) or (ii) are otherwise such that the person being recorded would have a reasonable expectation of privacy”).
211.
“Place where a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy” means:
(i) A place where a reasonable person would believe that he could undress, be undressed or
engage in sexual activity in privacy, without concern that he is being viewed, photographed,
filmed or otherwise recorded by an imaging device; or
(ii) A place where a person might reasonably expect to be safe from casual or hostile surveillance by an imaging device; or
(iii) Any public place where a person, by taking reasonable steps to conceal intimate areas,
should be free from the viewing, recording, storing or transmitting of images obtained by imaging devices designed to overcome the barriers created by a person’s covering of intimate
areas.
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-6609 (West 2014).
212. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-7-107 (West 2014); HAW. REV. STAT. § 711-1110.9 (West
2014); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-6609 (West 2014); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5B-203 (West 2014); VA.
CODE ANN. § 18.2-386.1 (West 2014).
213. Id.
214. Bedi, supra note 14.
215. Id.
216. United States v. Heras, 609 F.3d 101, 106 (2d Cir. 2010) (“The law has long recognized that
criminal intent may be proved by circumstantial evidence alone.”); United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d
88, 143 (2d Cir. 1998) (“[A]s a general rule most evidence of intent is circumstantial.”); State v. Cram,
955 A.2d 528, 530–31 (Vt. 2008).
217. Id.
218. Franks, Why We Need a Response to Revenge Porn, supra note 40 (“Many admitted purveyors of non-consensual pornography maintain, with some plausibility, that their sole intention is to obtain
notoriety, fulfill some sexual desire, or increase traffic for their websites.”).
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joke.”219 The intent element in these statutes is also too narrow.220 For instance, requiring the intent to cause severe emotional distress may not cover cases where a former couple is competing for the same job and the postposter wants to discredit his former paramour to obtain the position.221
Without the intent to cause emotional distress and without guidelines regarding how to prove the defendant knew the images were to remain private, posting revenge porn would not constitute a crime although its
ultimate effects would remain the same.222
B. The Primary Concern with Laws Criminalizing Revenge Porn
Would Impermissibly Infringe on Free Speech
The most frequently cited concern regarding a law criminalizing revenge porn is that it would infringe on free speech.223 Free speech protections extend to the internet.224 When speech is restricted, and that speech
does not fall under an exception, the government must have a compelling
interest to restrict the speech and the restriction must be narrowly tailored.225 These concerns may result in reluctance to criminalize revenge
porn.226 First Amendment groups voiced concerns about an early draft of
California’s law because it did not require actual harm.227 While some laws
require identification, many do not, which may result in the statutes being
overly broad because they do not require actual harm.228 The law, like most
others criminalizing revenge porn, requires the victim suffer “emotional
distress,”229 but some critics maintain it criminalizes too much speech.230
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219. Bedi, supra note 14.
220. Andrews, supra note 47.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl. 2. (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech.”); Laird, supra note 3; Goode, supra note 4 (“proposals have met opposition from critics who
worry that such laws would infringe on the First Amendment. And some experts, like Eric Goldman, a
law professor at Santa Clara University, have said that any state law would be vulnerable to First
Amendment challenges.”).
224. Doe v. Shurtleff, 628 F.3d 1217, 1222 (10th Cir. 2010) (citing Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844,
870 (1997)); see also James v. Meow Media, Inc., 300 F.3d 683, 696 (6th Cir. 2002).
225. United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000); Reno 521 U.S. at 874;
Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989); Ryan, supra note 1, at 366.
226. Samakow, supra note 128.
227. Laird, supra note 3.
228. Requires identification: CAL. PENAL CODE § 647 (West 2013); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 187-107 (West 2014); HAW. REV. STAT. § 711-1110.9 (West 2014). Doesn’t require identification: ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1425 (2014) (West); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-90 (West 2014); IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 18-6609 (West 2014); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5b-203 (West 2014).
229. Aaron Sankinaaron, Revenge Porn: California Legislators Go after Troubling New Trend,
HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 7, 2013, 10:16 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/05/revengeporn-california_n_3391638.html; see e.g. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-7-107 (West 2014) (distress and
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Critics also fear these laws may chill valuable speech by preventing the
distribution of images demonstrating “a crime or impropriety.”231 Issues of
crime or impropriety, like political sex scandals, affect the public and are
newsworthy, so they would retain protection under freedom of the press.232
Only one law explicitly excludes images for newsworthy events, and none
mention political malfeasance.233 A carefully drafted law would clearly
exclude images disseminated for these and similar lawful purposes.234
Moreover, “it is disingenuous to proclaim such laws ‘worse’ than the problem because someone may hypothetically want to post nude photos of a
public figure to show unfitness for office.”235
Another oft-cited concern is that these statutes restrict the content of
speech by focusing on revenge porn’s offensive nature.236 When a law prohibits the content or viewpoint of speech—including speech intended to
annoy, harass, or cause emotional distress—courts deem the restriction
unconstitutional.237 Commentators argue statutes that prohibit revenge
porn, and thus focus on harassment or emotional distress, do not serve a
compelling government interest.238 They argue protecting people from
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identification); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-90 (West 2014) (emotional distress); HAW. REV. STAT. § 7111110.9 (West 2014) (identifiable); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5b-203 (West 2014) (emotional distress).
230. Laird, supra note 3.
231. Bedi, supra note 14.
232. McCann v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 828 F. Supp. 2d 317, 323 (D.D.C. 2011)
(“to overcome the privacy interests at stake, Plaintiff must show that the exempt information is necessary to ‘shed any light on the [mis]conduct of any Government agency or official.’”) (quoting U.S.
Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 772–73 (1989)); U.S.
CONST. amend. I, cl. 2.
233. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-7-107(2) (West 2014) (“It shall not be an offense under this
section if the photograph, video, or image is related to a newsworthy event.”).
234. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1425 (2014) (WEST); GA. ANN. CODE § 16-11-90 (West 2014);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5b-203 (West 2014); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-386.1 (West 2014).
235. Matorin, supra note 7.
236. See generally Eugene Volokh, One-to-One Speech vs. One-to-Many Speech, Criminal Harassment Laws, and “Cyberstalking”, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 731 (2013) [hereinafter Volokh, One-to-One
Speech vs. One-to-Many Speech].
237. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55 (1988) (discussing “our longstanding
refusal to allow damages to be awarded because the speech in question may have an adverse emotional
impact on the audience.”); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 745 (1978) (“the fact that society may
find speech offensive is not a sufficient reason for suppressing it. Indeed, if it is the speaker’s opinion
that gives offense, that consequence is a reason for according it constitutional protection.”); Street v.
New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969) (“It is firmly settled that . . . the public expression of ideas may
not be prohibited merely because the ideas are themselves offensive to some of their hearers”); Snyder
v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206, 226 (4th Cir. 2009) (“Some ‘breathing space’ for contentious speech is essential, however, under the Free Speech Clause.”); Volokh, One-to-One Speech vs. One-to-Many Speech,
supra note 236, at 768–69, 772.
238. John A. Humbach, Privacy and the Right of Free Expression, 11 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 16,
31 (2012); But see Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 351–52 (1967) (“What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office,
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harm due to the “non-consensual dissemination of personal secrets”239 does
not constitute a compelling government interest. Commentators contend
that the right to know private facts about others outweighs the individual’s
right to privacy.240 This claim turns on the right to know “the truth about
qualities, character, conduct, and propensities of those around us and, to put
it bluntly, the adverse ways in which they might affect us.”241 While in the
case of a pedophile or rapist, this argument is tenable, it loses its impact for
things that do not affect others directly, such as the fact someone took or
allowed a significant other to take sexually explicit images.242
Critics further emphasize that the release of personal information does
not involve imminent death or destruction, and harms such as embarrassment, humiliation and economic losses are “not likely to be seriously debilitating.”243 However, this contention ignores the fact that revenge porn
results in physical threats, stalking, attacks, or even death, each of which
constitute imminent danger.244
Critics also insist, because of the newness of the right to keep personal
information private, statutes criminalizing revenge porn should not protect
personal information.245 However, people have a vested interest in protecting their privacy. For centuries, scholars and philosophers discussed the
importance of privacy.246 Privacy protection entered American law in the
1890s, and is thus by no means a new right.247 The right to personal privacy
for non-public individuals whose sexual activity has no impact on their
coworkers or friends is greater than the right to information protected with-
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is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an
area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.”) (internal citations omitted).
239. Humbach, supra note 238, at 34.
240. Id. at 35.
241. Id.
242. Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling Implications of
a Right to Stop People from Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1049, 1094 (2000) (“In some
instances, it may be quite unlikely that certain speech would be useful to the listeners either for political
purposes or for daily life purposes; this largely has to do with information that shows people in ridiculous, embarrassing, or demeaning contexts without revealing any useful new information about them.
Everybody knows that I go to the bathroom; printing a picture of me on the toilet would embarrass me
not because it reveals something new about me, but because it shows me in a pose that by cultural
convention is seen as ridiculous or undignified.”) [hereinafter Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy].
243. Humbach, supra note 238, at 34.
244. Franks, Unwilling Avatars, supra note 9, at 246.
245. Humbach, supra note 238, at 36 (“the very newness of the freestanding right of privacy is at
least some indication that it protects little that the law has not long protected anyway.”).
246. Judith DeCew, Privacy, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta
ed., 2013), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2013/entries/privacy/ (the right to privacy concept goes
back to Aristotle).
247. Id. (“Early treatises on privacy appeared with the development of privacy protection in American law from the 1890’s”).
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in the ambit of the First Amendment.248 A carefully crafted law can protect
this privacy right.
III. HOW A LAW CAN CRIMINALIZE REVENGE PORN, PROTECT
VICTIMS, AND NOT VIOLATE THE CONSTITUTION
Although First Amendment concerns loom over revenge porn legislation, the right to free speech is limited.249 Free speech does not—and
should not—protect the ability to defame others or invade their privacy by
disseminating nude or sexually explicit images without consent:250 Speech
that is “‘vulgar,’ ‘offensive,’ and ‘shocking’ . . . is not entitled to absolute
constitutional protection under all circumstances.”251 Courts examine laws
that infringe on speech, including images, using strict scrutiny unless the
speech falls under an exception, like obscenity when courts use rational
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248. Lofton v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 377 F.3d 1275, 1282 (11th Cir. 2004)
(footnotes omitted) (“The right to privacy that is the touchstone for a right to sexual intimacy by consenting adults has its Supreme Court lineage and trajectory through the decisions in Griswold (1965),
Eisenstadt (1972), Roe v. Wade (1973), and Carey (1977), and culminating with Lawrence (2003).”);
Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Freedom of Info. Comm’n, No. CV950555483S, 1996 WL 589253, at *2
(Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 3, 1996) (“Sexual relations, for example, are normally entirely private matters . . . . When these intimate details of his life are spread before the public gaze in a manner highly
offensive to the ordinary reasonable man, there is an actionable invasion of privacy, unless the matter is
one of legitimate public interest.”) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. b); Jersevic v. Kuhl, No. 238808, 2003 WL 1558207, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 25, 2003) (“there is ample
support for plaintiff’s claim that his status as a public official did not necessarily elevate his sexual
relations into a matter of legitimate public interest. There is no evidence that plaintiff used or misused
his office or in any way made his private sexual matters a matter of public concern.”).
249. Brush, supra note 48 (“The First Amendment is strong, powerful and important—but it’s not
absolute,” quoting Neil Richards); Matorin, supra note 7 (“The First Amendment’s guarantee of free
speech is not absolute. This is not merely ‘uncomfortable speech’ and there is no difficulty differentiating between this and newsworthy stories.”); Samakow, supra note 128 (“Not all speech is protected.
Laws can and should be crafted in every state, and federally, that make illegal the nonconsensual dissemination of nude images or videos of others. This is a very simple concept that is easily defined. It
should be seriously punished once proven.”).
250. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 301–02 (1964) (“The imposition of liability
for private defamation does not abridge the freedom of public speech or any other freedom protected by
the First Amendment.”); United States v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 701, 710 (6th Cir. 1996) (The Supreme
Court has “recognized that the right to possess obscene materials in the privacy of one’s home does not
create ‘a correlative right to receive it, transport it, or distribute it’ in interstate commerce even if it is
for private use only. Nor does it create ‘some zone of constitutionally protected privacy [that] follows
such material when it is moved outside the home area.’”) (quoting United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139,
141–42 (1973) (zone); United States v. 12 200–Ft. Reels of Super 8mm. Film, 413 U.S. 123, 128 (1973)
(distribute)); Anita L. Allen, What We Must Hide: The Ethics of Privacy and the Ethos of Disclosure,
25 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 1, 9 (2012) [hereinafter Allen, What We Must Hide]; Brush, supra note 48
(quoting Mary Anne Franks).
251. F.C.C. v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 747 (1978).
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basis review.252 Revenge porn is not protected speech because it is obscene,
and therefore falls under a categorical exception to the First Amendment.253
Regardless, even if courts do not deem revenge porn obscene, a sufficiently clear law would avoid running afoul of the First Amendment.254
First Amendment scholars say careful drafting could keep any law criminalizing revenge porn from running afoul of the First Amendment.255 Indeed, one free speech defender says “a suitably clear and narrow statute
banning nonconsensual posting of nude pictures of another, in a context
where there’s good reason to think that the subject did not consent to publication would be constitutional” because a narrow statute would avoid criminalizing too much speech.256 Another argues a law regulating public
exhibition of sexual acts “would be presumptively valid” because it is a
legitimate governmental regulation that does “not significantly infringe any
privacy rights.”257 A law with specific definitions would apply only in certain instances. Exceptions for lawful dissemination and voluntary exposure
would similarly avoid criminalizing too much speech. Focusing on the
time, place and manner of revenge porn would prevent a law from criminalizing the speech’s content.
A. Revenge Porn is Not Protected Speech Because It Falls under the
Categorical First Amendment Exception for Obscenity
Free Speech protections are subject to several categorical exceptions
including obscenity.258 The Supreme Court balances free speech “against
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252. Ripplinger v. Collins, 868 F.2d 1043, 1050 (9th Cir. 1989); Ryan, supra note 1, at 366.
253. Humbach, supra note 238, at 39; Ryan, supra note 1, at 365–66 (“the state has the authority to
intervene and curb . . . some instances of primary and secondary sexting between young adults based
upon the categorical exclusion of obscenity . . . from First Amendment protection.”).
254. See Appendix A, providing a sample statute criminalizing revenge porn, and Appendix B,
providing guidelines for legislators considering revenge porn laws.
255. Goode, supra note 4 (quoting Eugene Volokh); Matorin, supra note 7 (“Wrapping oneself in
the First Amendment with a shrug of the shoulders while pointing to non-existent or ineffective remedies is a cop-out. Free speech advocates should work with victims and legislators to draft effective laws
that protect legitimate speech. Public figures can be narrowly carved out to address theoretical scenarios. Public figures know what they’re getting into. Young women don’t sign up for that.”); Schulzke,
supra note 1 (quoting Mary Anne Franks and Eugene Volokh).
256. Bazelon, supra note 8 (quoting Eugene Volokh).
257. Lee Goldman, The Constitutional Right to Privacy, 84 DENV. U. L. REV. 601, 639 (2006)
[hereinafter Goldman, The Constitutional Right to Privacy].
258. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 25–26 (1973) (“Sex and nudity may not be exploited without limit by films or pictures exhibited or sold in places of public accommodation any more than live
sex and nudity can be exhibited or sold without limit in such public places. At a minimum, prurient,
patently offensive depiction or description of sexual conduct must have serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value to merit First Amendment protection.”); A Book Named “John Cleland’s Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure” v. Att’y Gen. of Mass., 383 U.S. 413, 418 (1966) (“[T]hree elements
must coalesce: it must be established that (a) the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole
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the government’s legitimate interests in protecting public health and safety.”259 Obscenity is not protected speech.260 The obscenity exception is
among the most promising bases for upholding laws that restrict free expression for the sake of privacy261 and as such is likely the best way to
combat revenge porn.
While some assert laws criminalizing revenge porn would be unconstitutional on the grounds pornography is protected speech, this argument is
untenable.262 The Supreme Court has held it is unconstitutional for a state
to criminalize private possession of pornography; however, “the States
retain broad power to regulate obscenity.”263 Protecting public health and
welfare is a legitimate State interest.264 The Nation and its States have a
right “to maintain a decent society” and these “primary requirements of
decency may be enforced against obscen[ity].”265 The Constitution does
“not protect the public, commercial exhibition of obscene films even when
restricted solely to consenting adults.”266 The Supreme Court respects each
state’s “long-recognized legitimate interest in regulating the use of obscene
material.”267 Indeed, “prurience and patent offensiveness are apparently
permissible grounds on which to discriminate—and by implication, they do
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appeals to a prurient interest in sex; (b) the material is patently offensive because it affronts contemporary community standards relating to the description or representation of sexual matters; and (c) the
material is utterly without redeeming social value.”); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957)
(“We hold that obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press.”).
259. McCullen v. Coakley, 571 F.3d 167, 174 (1st Cir. 2009).
260. Miller, 413 U.S. at 25–26; “John Cleland’s Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure”, 383 U.S. at
418; Roth, 354 U.S. at 485.
261. Humbach, supra note 238, at 25; Ryan, supra note 1, at 365–66 (“[T]he state has the authority
to intervene and curb . . . some instances of primary and secondary sexting between young adults based
upon the categorical exclusion of obscenity . . . from First Amendment protection.”).
262. Franks, Why We Need a Response to Revenge Porn, supra note 40 (“Whatever one’s views on
pornography more broadly, it should be a non-controversial proposition that pornography must at a
minimum be restricted to individuals who are 1.) adults and 2.) consenting.”).
263. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969) (“[T]he First and Fourteenth Amendments
prohibit making mere private possession of obscene material a crime . . . . [T]he States retain broad
power to regulate obscenity; that power simply does not extend to mere possession by the individual in
the privacy of his own home.”).
264. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 58 (1973).
265. Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 440 (1957) (“In an unbroken series of cases
extending over a long stretch of this Court’s history, it has been accepted as a postulate that ‘the primary requirements of decency may be enforced against obscene publications.’”); Near v. Minnesota ex rel.
Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931) (quoting Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
266. David B. Cruz, “The Sexual Freedom Cases”? Contraception, Abortion, Abstinence, and the
Constitution, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV 299, 320 (2000).
267. Paris Adult Theatre I, 413 U.S. at 57 (“The States have a long-recognized legitimate interest
in regulating the use of obscene material in local commerce and in all places of public accommodation,
as long as these regulations do not run afoul of specific constitutional prohibitions.”).
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not constitute ‘viewpoints’ . . . a distinction based on lasciviousness is
viewpoint neutral.”268
When courts deem speech obscene, they apply rational basis review
because obscene speech does not fall within the ambit of the First Amendment.269 Rational basis review requires a law be “substantially related to
important and legitimate objectives.”270 “States have a legitimate interest in
prohibiting dissemination or exhibition of obscene material when the mode
of dissemination carries with it a significant danger of offending the sensibilities of unwilling recipients.”271 Because revenge porn images are linked
to the victim’s social and professional networking profiles, it is highly
probable the images will be viewed by unwilling recipients who would find
them offensive. The Supreme Court has held that “[a]t a minimum, prurient, patently offensive depiction or description of sexual conduct must have
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value to merit First Amendment protection.”272 Revenge porn, designed solely to harass and humiliate
the perpetrator’s former paramour, simply cannot meet these requirements
to secure First Amendment protections.
When addressing the constitutionality of limits on obscene speech,
courts consider whether the speech has expressive value and whether it
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268. Gen. Media Commc’ns, Inc. v. Cohen, 131 F.3d 273, 282 (2d Cir. 1997) (discussing R.A.V.
v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 382–384 (1992)).
269. Williams v. Att’y Gen. of Ala., 378 F.3d 1232, 1236 (11th Cir. 2004) (“[T]he Lawrence
opinion did not employ fundamental-rights analysis and that it ultimately applied rational-basis review,
rather than strict scrutiny, to the challenged statute.”); Ripplinger v. Collins, 868 F.2d 1043, 1050 (9th
Cir. 1989) (“There is no fundamental right to engage in obscene speech. Strict scrutiny is thus not
appropriate.” The court applied a rational basis test, upholding laws that are “rationally related to a
legitimate state interest.”); Cohen, 131 F.3d at 282 (“Because we conclude that the Act regulates speech
in a nonpublic forum in a viewpoint-neutral manner, the Act need only be reasonable in light of the
purpose of the forum, and reflect a legitimate government concern, in order to pass constitutional
muster. The Supreme Court has admonished that a restriction in a nonpublic forum ‘need only be
reasonable; it need not be the most reasonable or the only reasonable limitation.’”) (internal citations
omitted); 1568 Montgomery Highway, Inc. v. City of Hoover, 45 So. 3d 319, 339 (Ala. 2010) (using
rational basis review for Texas statute which regulates the sale of sexual devices); State v. Brenan, 772
So. 2d 64, 76 (La. 2000) (using rational basis review to strike down as unconstitutional a law that “bans
the promotion of obscene devices” because it “bears no rational relationship to a legitimate state interest”).
270. City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 472 (1985); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 504 (1965) (White, J., concurring).
271. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 18–19 (1973); see Paris Adult Theatre I, 413 U.S. at 57
(recognizing “the high importance of the state interest in regulating the exposure of obscene materials to
juveniles and unconsenting adults.”); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 567 (1969); Ginsberg v. New
York, 390 U.S. 629, 637–643 (1968); Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767, 769 (1967); Jacobellis v.
Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 195 (1964).
272. Miller, 413 U.S. at 26.
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offends “contemporary community standards.”273 Courts may find “the
unauthorized distribution of pictures of a person naked or having sex . . . is
so valueless and so distressing that there is indeed a compelling interest in
restricting it.”274 This is particularly true because revenge porn is designed
to harass and humiliate victims by showing them “in ridiculous, embarrassing, or demeaning contexts without revealing any useful new information
about them”—making it useless for political or other legitimate purposes.275 Indeed, “[e]ven where speech is affected, the government has a compelling state interest in protecting citizens’ most basic privacy.”276 Most
people feel they have a right to keep their sexual activity private, particularly within an intimate relationship, and violating that privacy is offensive.
The Supreme Court agrees.277 Therefore, a court would almost certainly
find posting lascivious images solely to harass and humiliate the victim
offends community standards278 and find, therefore, revenge porn is obscene and thus not protected.
B. How a Law Criminalizing Revenge Porn Can Avoid Violating the
First Amendment
If, as seems likely, courts deem revenge porn unprotected obscenity,
then the law need only bear “some rational relationship to a legitimate state
purpose.”279 A law criminalizing revenge porn could easily meet this standard, as protecting privacy is not only a legitimate but also a substantial state
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273. Id. at 24; Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957) (Obscenity is determined by considering “whether to the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant
theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest.”).
274. Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy, supra note 242, at 1116.
275. Id. at 1094.
276. Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 456, 467–69 (1980); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599–600
(1977) (“cases . . . characterized as protecting ‘privacy’ have in fact involved at least two different
kinds of interests. One is the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters, and another
is the interest in independence in making certain kinds of important decisions.”) (footnotes omitted);
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350–51 (1967) (“the protection of a person’s general right to
privacy—his right to be let alone by other people—is, . . . left largely to the law of the individual
States.”); Kim, supra note 43, at 1057.
277. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567, 578 (2003) (extending the right to privacy to “the
most private human conduct, sexual behavior”).
278. Davenport v. Wash. Educ. Ass’n, 551 U.S. 177, 188 (2007) (“speech that is obscene or defamatory can be constitutionally proscribed because the social interest in order and morality outweighs
the negligible contribution of those categories of speech to the marketplace of ideas.”); R.A.V. v. City
of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 382–384 (1992); Roth, 354 U.S. at 489; Gen. Media Commc’ns, Inc.
v. Cohen, 131 F.3d 273, 282 (2d Cir. 1997) (discussing R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377,
382–384 (1992)); Kim, supra note 43, at 1048.
279. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 40 (1973); Ripplinger v. Collins, 868
F.2d 1043, 1050 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding “[t]here is no fundamental right to engage in obscene speech.
Strict scrutiny is thus not appropriate.” The court applied a rational basis test, upholding laws that are
“rationally related to a legitimate state interest.”).
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interest.280 However, even if a court did not deem revenge porn obscene, a
law criminalizing revenge porn can survive free-speech challenges in several ways. First, the law should require the subject be identified or identifiable and carefully define intent and consent.281 Second, the law should
specifically define the acts and body parts that cannot be depicted.282 Third,
the law should carefully restrict the “time, place, manner and means” of
revenge porn rather than its content.283 Fourth, the law should expressly
exclude consensual pornography and artistic works as well as nude images
taken to show impropriety or criminal activity to avoid being overly
broad.284 Fifth, the law should create a right to privacy when someone takes
or permits the taking of a nude photo specifically for viewing by her paramour.
1. Laws Criminalizing Revenge Porn Should Prevent Dissemination
of Lascivious Images of an Identified Subject without the Subject’s
Consent and Carefully Define Intent and Consent
A law criminalizing revenge porn should prohibit the taking, distribution, publication, dissemination or sale of “a sexually graphic visual depiction of an individual without that individual’s consent” via mail or “any
interactive computer service.”285 The statute should require the individual
be identified or identifiable to ensure there is actual harm.286 To secure a
criminal conviction, prosecutors must prove the defendant had the requisite
state of mind.287 Thus, these statutes should prohibit intentionally, knowingly or recklessly posting the nude or semi-nude image of another.288 In35947-ckt_90-1 Sheet No. 148 Side A
01/14/2015 15:25:42

280. Lanphere & Urbaniak v. Colorado, 21 F.3d 1508, 1516 (10th Cir. 1994) (recognizing “Colorado’s substantial interest in protecting privacy.”); Project 80’s, Inc. v. City of Pocatello, 942 F.2d 635,
638 (9th Cir. 1991) (“We previously accepted the cities’ asserted interests in protecting privacy [and]
preventing crime”); U.D. Registry, Inc. v. State, 144 Cal. App. 4th 405, 423 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006)
(“[T]he United States Supreme Court has recognized a substantial state interest in . . . protecting privacy.”) (citing Schaumburg v. Citizens for Better Env’t 444 U.S. 620, 636 (1980)).
281. Terrence Berg, State Criminal Jurisdiction in Cyberspace: Is There a Sheriff on the Electronic Frontier?, 79 MICH. B.J. 659, 659 (2000).
282. Brush, supra note 48.
283. Volokh, One-to-One Speech vs. One-to-Many Speech, supra note 236, at 769–70.
284. Kim, supra note 43, at 1058.
285. Franks, A Quick Guide, supra note 8 at 2–3.
286. CAL. PENAL CODE § 647 (West 2013); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-7-107 (West 2014);
HAW. REV. STAT. § 711-1110.9 (West 2014).
287. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 881 (9th ed. 2009).
288. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-6609 (West 2014) (criminalizing posting the nude or sexually explicit image of another when “[h]e either intentionally or with reckless disregard disseminates, publishes or
sells or conspires to disseminate, publish or sell any image or images of the intimate areas of another
person or persons without the consent of such other person or persons and he knows or reasonably
should have known that one (1) or both parties agreed or understood that the images should remain
private.”); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5b-203 (West 2014) (“An actor commits the offense of distribution
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of intimate images if the actor, with the intent to cause emotional distress or harm, knowingly or intentionally distributes to any third party any intimate image of an individual who is 18 years of age or
older, if: (a) the actor knows that the depicted individual has not given consent to the actor to distribute
the intimate image; (b) the intimate image was created by or provided to the actor under circumstances
in which the individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy; and (c) actual emotional distress or
harm is caused to the person as a result of the distribution.”).
289. United States v. Heras, 609 F.3d 101, 106 (2d Cir. 2010) (“The law has long recognized that
criminal intent may be proved by circumstantial evidence alone.”); United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d
88, 143 (2d Cir. 1998) (“[A]s a general rule most evidence of intent is circumstantial.”).
290. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-90 (West 2014).
291. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-7-107 (West 2014).
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tent can be difficult to prove in any criminal case because there is rarely
direct evidence, so courts permit circumstantial evidence.289 Since the sole
purpose of several websites is to permit users to post sexually explicit images to harass and humiliate others, posting a sexually explicit image on a
revenge porn site must be included as one way to prove the requisite intent.
Many states prohibit revenge porn intended to harass the victim or cause
her emotional distress, but some also prohibit revenge porn tied to other
purposes, including one that prohibits images which “cause[] financial loss
to the depicted person and serve[] no legitimate purpose to the depicted
person.”290
While many of these laws require the intent to harass, they fail to provide guidance as to what factors courts should consider. However, one state
provides some useful guidance: “[a]n actor . . . commits the offense of
posting a private image for harassment if he or she posts or distributes
through the use of social media or any web site any photograph, video, or
other image displaying the private intimate parts of an identified or identifiable person.”291 Revenge porn legislation should include similar language.
It should also include factors courts may consider to determine whether the
poster intended to harass and humiliate the victim. These factors include
but are not limited to, whether the post appears on any revenge porn sites or
sites similarly designed to harass and humiliate, whether the poster included the victim’s personal or contact information, and whether the poster
linked the images to the victim’s social networking pages.
To protect victims fully, any law criminalizing revenge porn should
apply to the dissemination of images intended not just to harass or humiliate, but also to cause professional harm. This would address cases where
friends or family members who, due to their relationship with the former
significant other, could gain access to and post the images simply because
they dislike their friends’ or family members’ former paramour, or to gain a
professional or educational advantage, or even when the perpetrator insists
he posted the pictures as a joke. This would protect victims even when the
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292. HAW. REV. STAT. § 711-1110.9 (West 2014).
293. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 942.09 (West 2014) (criminalizing the “reproduction of a representation
that the person knows or has reason to know was captured in violation of subd. 1. and that depicts the
nudity depicted in the representation captured in violation of subd. 1., if the person depicted nude in the
reproduction did not consent to the making of the reproduction.”).
294. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 950, 1385 (9th ed. 2009).
295. H.R. 260, 147th Gen Assemb. § 1335 (Del. 2013).
296. Jasenosky, supra note 170; Kelly, supra note 171 (citing a recent Cyber Civil Rights Initiative
survey).
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ex-paramour did not post the image. Hawaii’s statute provides a prime
example. It criminalizes the knowing disclosure of sexually explicit or nude
images without consent “with intent to harm substantially the depicted
person with respect to that person’s health, safety, business, calling, career,
financial condition, reputation, or personal relationships.”292 This would
protect victims from extensive and common revenge porn harms. Furthermore, to protect victims from further dissemination and re-posting by other
individuals, the laws should criminalize reproduction of revenge porn images when the subject did not consent to that reproduction.293
Laws should criminalize knowingly or recklessly posting revenge
porn.294 This would prevent defendants from avoiding culpability for posting revenge porn when they claim they did not know it would humiliate or
harass the victim or claim they believed the victim consented. These laws
must fully define consent as including “the lack of specific agreement,
approval, or assent to reproducing, distributing, exhibiting, publishing,
transmitting, or otherwise disseminating such visual depictions.”295 The
laws should also provide guidance as to how courts can determine whether
the subject consented. One way to provide this guidance would be to state:
due to the presumptive privacy expectation inherent in a dating or sexual
relationship with regard to sexually explicit images, when a person disseminates these images, they must overcome this presumption by providing
proof the victim consented.
Since eighty percent of revenge porn victims took the images themselves,296 the law must explicitly protect those victims. One way to do this
is to state: the fact an individual took or agreed to have another take a
sexually explicit image of herself for a specific individual does not mean
that individual gave up any reasonable expectation of privacy in that image, nor shall sharing the image with another indicate the victim intended
the image be disseminated to third parties. Any law criminalizing revenge
porn should require the subject’s written consent before the poster can
claim he reasonably believed he had permission to post the images. Requiring written permission and defining consent would prevent those who permitted someone to take sexually explicit images for publication from later
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changing their minds and claiming the images were published without consent. A written permission requirement would protect against fraudulent
claims and protect consensual pornography. However, it may be easy for
perpetrators to fake written consent by forging or copying the victim’s
signature, so the law should increase penalties when a perpetrator forges
the victim’s signature.
2. Laws Criminalizing Revenge Porn Should Define Sexually Graphic
Images with Sufficient Specificity to Avoid Being Overly Inclusive but
Broadly Enough to Protect Most Victims

01/14/2015 15:25:42

297. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-90 (West 2014) (“(2) “Nudity” means: (A) The showing of the
human male or female genitals, pubic area, or buttocks without any covering or with less than a full
opaque covering; (B) The showing of the female breasts without any covering or with less than a full
opaque covering; or (C) The depiction of covered male genitals in a discernibly turgid state.”); VA.
CODE ANN. § 18.2-386.1(A) (West 2014) (“[T]hat person is totally nude, clad in undergarments, or in a
state of undress so as to expose the genitals, pubic area, buttocks or female breast in a restroom, dressing room, locker room, hotel room, motel room, tanning bed, tanning booth, bedroom or other location.”); Jasenosky, supra note 170.
298. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1801 (West 2004); Franks, A Quick Guide, supra note 8, at 3.
299. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5b-203 (West 2014).
300. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2256 (West 2008); Franks, A Quick Guide, supra note 8, at 2.
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Laws to criminalize revenge porn should specifically define the prohibited images to avoid being overly broad. Most of the statutes specifically define sexually graphic images as those revealing intimate areas or
showing sexually explicit conduct.297 A proposed model law utilizes the
intimate areas definition from 18 U.S.C. Section 1801, “the naked or undergarment-clad genitals, pubic area, buttocks, or any portion of the female
breast below the top of the areola.”298 Utah’s law prohibits: “any visual
depiction . . . made or produced by electronic, mechanical, or other means,”
and specifically defines intimate image as one depicting “(i) exposed human male or female genitals or pubic area, with less than an opaque covering; (ii) a female breast with less than an opaque covering, or any portion
of the female breast below the top of the areola; or (iii) the individual engaged in any sexually explicit conduct.”299
The model law utilizes the definition of sexually explicit conduct in 18
U.S.C. Section 2256.300 Again, Utah’s law provides a good example definition of “sexually explicit conduct”:
actual or simulated:
(i) sexual intercourse, including genital-genital, oral-genital, analgenital, or oral-anal, whether between persons of the same or opposite
sex;
(ii) masturbation;
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(iii) bestiality;
(iv) sadistic or masochistic activities;
(v) exhibition of the genitals, pubic region, buttocks, or female breast
of any individual;
(vi) visual depiction of nudity or partial nudity;
(vii) fondling or touching of the genitals, pubic region, buttocks, or
female breast; or
(viii) explicit representation of the defecation or urination functions.301
Utilizing pre-existing statutory definitions for sexual acts or intimate
areas,302 and providing precise definitions of the intimate areas and actions,
are two ways laws can avoid constitutional challenges. When statutes include sufficiently detailed definitions to clearly explain what images are
prohibited, it prevents the statute from criminalizing more images than
necessary and thereby meets the narrowly tailored prong required under
strict scrutiny.
3. Laws Criminalizing Revenge Porn Should Create Exceptions to
Protect Consensual Pornography, Nudity in Art, and Images that Depict
Crimes or Political Misconduct

01/14/2015 15:25:42

301. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5b-203 (West 2014).
302. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-90 (West 2014) (“‘Sexually explicit conduct’ shall have the same
meaning as set forth in Code Section 16-12-100.”).
303. Franks, A Quick Guide, supra note 8, at 2.
304. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1425 (2014) (West); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-90 (West
2014); HAW. REV. STAT. § 711-1110.9 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Act 200); UTAH CODE ANN. § 765b-203 (West 2014); See also IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-6609 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Sess.); VA.
CODE ANN. § 18.2-386.1 (West 2014); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 942.09 (West 2014).
305. Claudia Tuchman, Does Privacy Have Four Walls? Salvaging Stanley v. Georgia, 94 COLUM.
L. REV. 2267, 2272 (1994).
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Any law criminalizing revenge porn must include an exception for
“voluntary exposure in public or commercial settings.”303 Most of the recent laws that criminalize revenge porn provide such an exception.304 A
voluntary exposure exception protects lawful pornography, the ownership
and creation of which the Supreme Court has repeatedly protected,305 as
well as protects artistic expression by eliminating liability for artists who
create, sell or publish nude paintings or drawings so long as the subject
consented. A voluntary exposure exception also protects theatrical productions involving nudity. Protecting art, performances, and consensual pornography, would prevent the law from being over-inclusive and chilling too
much speech.
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Another way to prevent a revenge porn statute from being overly
broad is by explicitly protecting images that show misconduct by public
figures, particularly political leaders.306 This would address concerns that
criminalizing revenge porn may chill important speech by preventing the
publication of images like those of Anthony Weiner because individuals
fear criminal liability.307 This exception would protect victims and the public’s right to know in cases of political misconduct.308 Another vital exception is one for images taken and disseminated for lawful purposes including
“law enforcement, reporting unlawful conduct, or legal proceedings.”309
Georgia’s law provides further protection for “legitimate medical, scientific
or educational activities,” as well as when an individual posts a sexually
explicit image of herself.310 Statutes criminalizing revenge porn should
incorporate the exceptions for medical, scientific and educational activities,
and include language such as: images taken and disseminated for lawful
purposes, including criminal investigations and criminal or civil legal proceedings, as well as images that demonstrate political malfeasance or impropriety shall not constitute revenge porn. By including exceptions to
protect artistic expression and lawful pornography, and images demonstrating criminal or improper behavior, the law would avoid being overly inclusive.
4. Laws Criminalizing Revenge Porn Should Carefully Restrict Its
Time, Place and Manner Rather than Its Content

01/14/2015 15:25:42

306. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-7-107 (West 2014) (“‘Newsworthy event’ means a matter of
public interest, public concern, or related to a public figure who is intimately involved in the resolution
of important public questions, or by reason of his or her fame shape events in areas of concern to society.”).
307. Bedi, supra note 14, at 2.
308. Goldman, It’s Not Easy To Regulate Revenge Porn, supra note 120, at 3.
309. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1425 (2014) (West); see GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-90 (West
2014); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5b-203 (West 2014); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-386.1 (West 2014); Cf.
Franks, A Quick Guide, supra note 8, at 2.
310. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-90 (West 2014).
311. McCullen v. Coakley, 571 F.3d 167, 175 (1st Cir. 2009); see Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77
(1949) (using intermediate scrutiny to determine the constitutionality of a law that restricts the time,
place and manner of speech.).
312. Volokh, One-to-One Speech vs. One-to-Many Speech, supra note 236, at 770 (citing Thorne
v. Bailey, 846 F.2d 241, 243 (4th Cir. 1988); Gormley v. Dir., 632 F.2d 938, 941–42 (2d Cir. 1980)).
313. Kim, supra note 43, at 1049.
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Courts uphold laws that “regulate the time, place, and manner” of
speech,311 particularly when they restrict conduct such as “harassment” or
“stalking.”312 These restrictions on the manner of expression “provide for
public safety and . . . maintain order.”313 Generally, laws are content-
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neutral when they “burden speech for reasons unrelated to either the speaker’s viewpoint or the speech’s content.”314 Courts treat “facially contentbased laws . . . as content neutral if they are justified with reference to the
‘secondary effects’ of speech”—for example protecting a community from
the crime and degradation that may accompany an adult movie theatre.315
Furthermore, courts uphold a content-neutral law even when “incidentally,
it has an adverse effect on certain messages while leaving others untouched.”316 When a law incidentally burdens speech it is subject to intermediate scrutiny, and courts sustain “a content-neutral regulation . . . if it
furthers an important governmental interest that is unrelated to the suppression of free expression and the incidental restriction on alleged First
Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of
that interest.”317
A law criminalizing revenge porn furthers an important or substantial
government interest. The state has a substantial interest in protecting its
citizens’ privacy and protecting them from physical danger.318 Criminalizing revenge porn does not suppress expression because posting a sexually
explicit image solely to harass the subject is not expression that implicates
First Amendment protections.319 Nudity alone is not protected expressive
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314. McCullen, 571 F.3d at 174–75.
315. Volokh, One-to-One Speech vs. One-to-Many Speech, supra note 236, at 770; see City of
Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47–48 (1986) (holding “intermediate scrutiny is the
proper standard of review for ordinances aimed against the secondary effects of adult businesses.”
Reasoning that “the Renton ordinance is aimed not at the content of the films shown at ‘adult motion
picture theatres,’ but rather at the secondary effects of such theaters on the surrounding community.”
The court further found “[t]he ordinance by its terms is designed to prevent crime, protect the city’s
retail trade, maintain property values, and generally ‘protec[t] and preserv[e] the quality of [the city’s]
neighborhoods, commercial districts, and the quality of urban life,’ not to suppress the expression of
unpopular views . . . . In short, the Renton ordinance is completely consistent with our definition of
‘content-neutral’ speech regulations as those that ‘are justified without reference to the content of the
regulated speech . . . .’” quoting Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976)); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 563–64 (1969) (“Roth and its progeny
certainly do mean that the First and Fourteenth Amendments recognize a valid governmental interest in
dealing with the problem of obscenity.”).
316. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. at 47–48; McGuire v. Reilly, 260 F.3d 36, 43 (1st Cir.
2001) (citing Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 736 (2000)).
317. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 624 (1994) (“a content-neutral regulation will
be sustained if it furthers an important governmental interest that is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression and the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is
essential to the furtherance of that interest.”); United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (“[A]
government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the Government;
if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated
to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment
freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.”).
318. Kim, supra note 43, at 1056–57; see Paris Adult Theatre I. v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 59–61
(1973) (quoting Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 199 (1964)) (Warren, C.J., dissenting)); McCullen v.
Coakley, 571 F.3d 167, 174–75 (1st Cir. 2009).
319. Kim, supra note 43, at 1056–57.
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conduct.320 While photographs—even erotic ones—can be protected expression,321 obscenity is not,322 nor is the act of intercourse.323 Since posting
a nude picture without the subject’s consent is obscene because it offends
community norms,324 and since the subjects of revenge porn images are not
the posters, the act of expression is only “the uploading of another’s image.
Even where speech is affected, the government has a compelling state interest in protecting citizens’ most basic privacy.”325
Specifically prohibiting the manner and means of revenge pornography will prevent the law from being overly broad. A law prohibiting revenge porn should focus on the harassing nature of revenge porn and its
distribution via web sites, the sole purpose of which is to humiliate unsuspecting victims. It should also address the physical dangers inherent in
revenge porn. An example of language to prohibit the means and manner
but not the content is: given the physical and psychological dangers to the
subject, an actor is prohibited from posting a nude or sexually explicit
image of another on a website designed to harass, demean, or cause professional, psychological or emotional harm to the victim. The fact a poster
claims he posted the images as a joke alone shall not constitute a defense,
particularly when the defendant knew or should have known the act could
lead to harassment or harm to the victim. This would prohibit the means
and manner of revenge porn as opposed to prohibiting its sexually explicit
content.
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320. While erotic dancing is protected expressive conduct, it is public commercial entertainment,
making it fundamentally different from revenge porn. City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 289
(2000) (“Being ‘in a state of nudity’ is not an inherently expressive condition. . . . [H]owever, nude
[barroom] dancing . . . is expressive conduct, although . . . it falls only within the outer ambit of the
First Amendment’s protection.”); see also Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 566 (1991)
(“[N]ude dancing of the kind sought to be performed here is expressive conduct within the outer perimeters of the First Amendment, though we view it as only marginally so.”).
321. W. Va. Bd. Of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 632 (1943); ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc.,
332 F.3d 915, 924 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of
Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995)) (photographs are protected speech); Douglass v. Hustler Magazine,
Inc., 769 F.2d 1128, 1141 (7th Cir. 1985) (erotic photographs are protected speech).
322. United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468 (2010) (citing Roth v. United States,
354 U.S. 476, 483 (1957)); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973) (citing Kois v. Wisconsin, 408
U.S. 229 (1972)).
323. 832 Corp. v. Gloucester Twp., 404 F.Supp.2d 614, 626 (D.N.J. 2005) (“Having sex, without
more, is not expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment.”); Connection Distrib. Co. v. Reno,
154 F.3d 281, 289 n.8 (6th Cir. 1998); O’Connor v. City and Cnty. of Denver, 894 F.2d 1210, 1218
(10th Cir. 1990).
324. Roth, 354 U.S. at 489.
325. Kim, supra note 43, at 1056–57.
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An “individual’s natural rights end[] where they cause[] harm to others.” Current trends indicate courts would likely uphold a law criminalizing revenge porn:
326

[t]he law seems to be returning . . . to an era when criminal libel laws
could impose liability . . . for true statements or opinions that were supposedly not said with ‘good motives’ . . . when the speech is harshly critical and thus potentially damaging to reputation.327

Because protecting privacy for sexual activity is a substantial interest,328 states can incidentally prohibit the dissemination of revenge porn.
Similarly, because even “facially content-based laws” survive constitutional challenges when “they are justified with reference to the ‘secondary
effects’ of speech,”329 a law prohibiting revenge porn to protect victims
because of its inherent dangers including stalking, harassment and physical
violence330 would withstand a constitutional challenge.
5. Laws Criminalizing Revenge Porn Should Incorporate and Define
an Appropriate Right to Privacy for Sexually Explicit Images Taken in the
Context of an Intimate Relationship
“Privacy . . . has a place in free society. Our moral interests include
freedom from judgment, freedom to don masks, freedom to build and maintain reputations, and freedom to and from intimacy.”331 There is a legal
right to privacy in America—it appears in our judiciary’s interpretation of
the Constitution, including the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, as well
as Federal, state, and common laws.332 The right to privacy includes causes
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326. Goldman, The Constitutional Right to Privacy, supra note 257, at 622.
327. Volokh, One-to-One Speech vs. One-to-Many Speech, supra note 236, at 738.
328. Courts recognize a substantial state interest in protecting privacy. See Carey v. Brown, 447
U.S. 455, 456 (1980) (“the State’s interest in protecting the . . . privacy of the home is of the highest
order”); Lanphere & Urbaniak v. Colorado, 21 F.3d 1508, 1516 (10th Cir. 1994) (discussing “Colorado’s substantial interest in protecting privacy.”); Project 80’s, Inc. v. City of Pocatello, 942 F.2d 635,
638 (9th Cir. 1991) (“We previously accepted the cities’ asserted interests in protecting privacy, preventing crime, and protecting consumers as substantial state interests.”); U.D. Registry, Inc. v. State,
144 Cal. App. 4th 405, 423 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006); State v. Sheldon, 629 A.2d 753, 762 n. 2 (Md. 1993)
(“the Supreme Court held that . . . a state has compelling interest in protecting privacy”) (citations
omitted); see also Schaumburg v. Citizens for Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620, 631 (1980).
329. Volokh, One-to-One Speech vs. One-to-Many Speech, supra note 236, at 771.
330. Franks, Unwilling Avatars, supra note 9, at 246.
331. Allen, What We Must Hide, supra note 250, at 12.
332. U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl. 2, 3; U.S. CONST. amend. IV, cl. 1; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1;
DOJ v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 763–64 (1989) (“Both common law
and the literal understandings of privacy encompass the individual’s control of information concerning
his or her person. In an organized society, there are few facts that are not at one time or another divulged to another. Thus the extent of the protection accorded a privacy right at common law rested in
part on the degree of dissemination of the allegedly private fact and the extent to which the passage of
time rendered it private. According to Webster’s initial definition, information may be classified as
‘private’ if it is ‘intended for or restricted to the use of a particular person or group or class of persons:
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of action for intrusion upon seclusion, publication of embarrassing private
facts, being placed in a false light, or the use of one’s name or likeness
without consent.333 Victims of criminal activity, particularly involving sexual use without consent, have a heightened expectation of privacy.334 This
privacy right covers “traditionally private relationships” including “voluntary sexual relationships . . . where individuals enjoy a clear expectation of
privacy.”335 The Supreme Court has directly addressed the right to privacy
regarding forced nudity:
No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control
of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others . . . to
compel anyone, and especially a woman, to lay bare the body, or to submit to the touch of a stranger, without unlawful authority, is an indignity,
an assault, and a trespass.336

Similarly, the Seventh Circuit suggested in dicta that revenge porn
would constitute a privacy invasion: “[i]magine if nude pictures of a woman, uploaded to the Internet without her consent though without identifying
her by name, were downloaded in a foreign country by people who will
never meet her. She would still feel that her privacy had been invaded.”337
A law criminalizing revenge porn should define the right to privacy,
such as: “[a] person who has consented to the capture or possession of an
image within the context of a private or confidential relationship retains a
reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to disclosure beyond that
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not freely available to the public.’”); Gruschus v. Curtis Pub. Co., 342 F.2d 775, 776 (10th Cir. 1965)
(“The intangible but protected right of privacy recognizes, with some limitations, a right to seclusion, to
freedom from public disclosure of personal matters of private life and other damaging and unnewsworthy publicity of a personal nature, and to recover for the appropriation of name or picture.”); Allen,
What We Must Hide, supra note 250, at 13, 14.
333. Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 457 (1977) (right to privacy protects “the
individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters.”); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599
(1977); Union Pac. Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891); Smith v. City of Artesia, 772 P.2d 373,
376 (N.M. Ct. App. 1989) (the constitutional right to info privacy “closely resembles—and may be
identical to—the interest protected by the common law prohibition against unreasonable publicity given
to one’s private life.”); Jennings v. Minco Tech. Labs, Inc., 765 S.W.2d 497, 502 (Tex. App. 1989)
(“[T]he central element of the right of privacy and its attendant public policy: the individual’s exclusive
right to determine the occasion, extent, and conditions under which he will disclose his private affairs to
others.”).
334. Aid for Women v. Foulston, 441 F.3d 1101, 1128 (10th Cir. 2006) (Herrera, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part); see Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 149 (1991) (valid legislative determination that rape victims deserve heightened protection against surprise, harassment, and unnecessary
invasions of privacy.”); Bloch v. Ribar, 156 F.3d 673, 685 (6th Cir.1998) (“a number of our sister
circuits have concluded that information regarding private sexual matters warrants constitutional protection against public dissemination.”).
335. Aid for Women, 441 F.3d at 1128 (Herrera, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
336. Botsford, 141 U.S. at 252.
337. Nw. Mem’l Hosp. v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 923, 929 (7th Cir. 2004).

35947-ckt_90-1 Sheet No. 153 Side A

01/14/2015 15:25:42

P10 - KITCHEN (WITH CHANGES).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

CRIMINALIZING REVENGE PORN

1/5/2015 9:40 AM

291

relationship.”338 It should also define a private or confidential relationship
as any intimate or sexual relationship. A reasonable expectation of privacy
relies on societal understandings of what people “seek[] to preserve as private,”339 a concept which, for the Fourth Amendment, excludes information
“knowingly expose[d] to the public, even in [one’s] own home.”340 However, there are instances where people make information accessible to others
but retain a reasonable expectation of privacy.341 This is particularly true
for private relationships even when someone takes or consents to having a
sexually explicit image taken.342 Including a reasonable expectation of privacy will help prevent a loophole that might allow perpetrators to avoid
criminal liability “by arguing that, in sharing the image in the first place,
the complainant waived any expectation of privacy.”343 By defining a reasonable expectation of privacy,344 emphasizing that a reasonable expectation of privacy arises from “circumstances in which a reasonable person
would know or understand that the image was to remain private; and knows
or should have known that the person in the image has not consented to the
dissemination,”345 and creating a presumptive right to privacy within an
intimate relationship, legislation would properly treat revenge porn not as a
First Amendment issue but rather as a privacy issue.
Protecting privacy is “an important way to achieve desired forms of
limited access.”346 Privacy includes the right to “restrict publication of intimate facts.”347 Further, it deserves protection even when people are indifferent to it due to their age or because they do not comprehend the risks of
new technologies.348 There are things we must hide to protect our “common
dignity and separate virtues” as well as to protect ourselves from harm.349
Dignity, autonomy, and the right to have relationships are inherent to hu35947-ckt_90-1 Sheet No. 153 Side A
01/14/2015 15:25:42

338. Franks, A Quick Guide, supra note 8, at 2.
339. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
340. Id.
341. Laird, supra note 3, at 3 (“[Mary Anne] Franks analyzes the issue as one of consent in context. Just as a boxer hasn’t consented to be punched outside the ring, someone who sends a naughty
picture to a lover has not consented to have that picture distributed online.”); Brush, supra note 48, at
5–6 (citing privacy expert, Neil Richards).
342. Id.
343. Brush, supra note 48, at 6.
344. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-6609 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Sess.); UTAH CODE ANN. § 765b-203 (West 2014); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-386.1 (West 2014); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 942.09 (West
2014).
345. H.R. 4320, 98th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2014); see also Concepcion, supra note 130, at
2–3 (citing Chicago criminal defense lawyer and DePaul adjunct sociology professor, Matt Fakhoury).
346. Allen, What We Must Hide, supra note 250, at 4–5.
347. Id. at 5.
348. Id. at 18.
349. Id.
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man beings and for things such as sexual activity, “people should be largely
let alone.”350 Many scholars argue people deserve protection “against negligence, cruelty, and unjustified damage to their reputations.”351 The government has an interest in protecting individual privacy.352 Protecting priprivacy preserves reputations and helps “sustain civility by condemning
behaviors that offend courtesy, honor, and appropriateness.”353 Privacy
promotes personal relationships by permitting individuals to keep personal
information private.354 It enhances “respect for human dignity” and autonomy.355 In the case of revenge porn “[t]here is indisputably a privacy interest at stake where unauthorized, widespread distribution of nude images is
concerned.”356
CONCLUSION
Revenge porn harms thousands of victims.357 They sometimes suffer
horrific consequences including committing suicide, being harassed, assaulted, stalked and murdered.358 Current civil and criminal laws inadequately protect victims.359 Because revenge porn perpetrators are frequently
judgment-proof, criminal law provides a far greater deterrent than civil
law.360 Thus, laws criminalizing revenge porn are necessary. Currently ten
states attempt to criminalize revenge porn, and laws are pending in several
states.361 Some raise constitutional concerns or fail to protect the vast majority of victims.362 However, as this Note demonstrates, a law criminalizing revenge porn can protect victims, deter revenge porn, and meet
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350. Allen, Privacy Jurisprudence as an Instrument of Social Change, supra note 128, at 890.
351. Id. at 917 (quoting Cass R. Sunstein, Believing False Rumors, in THE OFFENSIVE INTERNET:
PRIVACY, SPEECH, AND REPUTATION 106 (Saul Levmore & Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 2011-2012)).
352. Lanphere & Urbaniak v. Colorado, 21 F.3d 1508, 1516 (10th Cir. 1994); Project 80’s, Inc. v.
City of Pocatello, 942 F.2d 635, 638 (9th Cir. 1991); U.D. Registry, Inc. v. State, 144 Cal. App. 4th
405, 423 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006); Humbach, supra note 252, at 32.
353. Allen, What We Must Hide, supra note 250, at 6.
354. Id.
355. Id.
356. Kim, supra note 43, at 1056–57.
357. Lang, supra note 2.
358. Franks, Unwilling Avatars, supra note 9, at 246.
359. Ryan, supra note 1, at 375; Matorin, supra note 7, at 4; Clark-Flory, supra note 45 (quoting
Erica Johnstone).
360. Franks, Why We Need a Response to Revenge Porn, supra note 40, at 6; Clark-Flory, supra
note 45 (quoting Erica Johnstone).
361. State ‘Revenge Porn’ Legislation, supra note 31.
362. Goldman, It’s Not Easy To Regulate Revenge Porn, supra note 120; Jasenosky, supra note
170; Kelly, supra note 171; see CAL. PENAL CODE § 647 (West 2013); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 942.09 (West
2014).
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constitutional free speech requirements.363 Because the internet creates “a
larger and more accessible pool of victims,”364 the time is ripe for courts to
extend privacy protections, particularly in regards to revenge porn. These
protections should include the right to keep personal sexual behavior private when the sole purpose or effect of disseminating sexually explicit
images is to harass or humiliate.
APPENDIX A
MODEL REVENGE PORN STATUTE

01/14/2015 15:25:42

363. For examples of a statute and guidelines for statutes, see Appendices A and B.
364. Berg, supra note 281, at 659 (quoting Attorney General Janet Reno).
365. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5b-203 (West 2014).
366. H.R. 260, 147th Gen. Assemb., 2nd Reg. Sess. § 1335 (Del. 2014).
367. CAL. PENAL CODE § 647 (West 2013); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-7-107 (West 2014);
HAW. REV. STAT. § 711-1110.9 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Act 200); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 942.09
(West 2014); Franks, A Quick Guide, supra note 8, at 2–3.
368. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-90 (West 2014).
369. HAW. REV. STAT. § 711-1110.9 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Act 200).
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1) Given the physical and psychological dangers to the subject, and to
protect an individual’s right to privacy particularly regarding sexual activity, it shall be a crime for an actor to post a nude or sexually explicit image
of another on a website designed to harass, demean, or cause professional,
psychological or emotional harm to the victim.
a) An actor may not intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly take, reproduce, distribute, publish, sell or otherwise disseminate via mail or electronic means including the internet, email, social media or any web site, an
intimate, nude, semi-nude, or sexually explicit photograph, video or image
captured “by electronic, mechanical, or other means,”365 including images
obtained through theft, “unauthorized access to a computer system . . . or
by unauthorized access to electronic mail or an electronic mail service provider”366 of an individual who is identified or identifiable either by that
image or by materials associated with that image without the subject’s consent and when that image is intended to cause, or is likely to cause367 harassment or emotional distress or “cause[] financial loss . . . and serve[] no
legitimate purpose to the depicted person”368 or those that “harm substantially the depicted person with respect to that person’s health, safety, business, calling, career, financial condition, reputation, or personal
relationships.”369
i) An intimate image is one that depicts:
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370. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5b-203 (West 2014).
371. Id.

35947-ckt_90-1 Sheet No. 154 Side B

A) an “exposed human male or female genitals or pubic area, with
less than an opaque covering;”
B) a “female breast with less than an opaque covering, or any portion of the female breast below the top of the areola; or
C) an “individual engaged in any sexually explicit conduct;”370 or
D) “actual or simulated:
(i) sexual intercourse, including genital-genital, oral-genital,
analgenital, or oral-anal, whether between persons of the same or opposite
sex;
(ii) masturbation;
(iii) bestiality;
(iv) sadistic or masochistic activities;
(v) exhibition of the genitals, pubic region, buttocks, or female breast
of any individual;
(vi) visual depiction of nudity or partial nudity;
(vii) fondling or touching of the genitals, pubic region, buttocks,
or
female breast; or
(viii) explicit representation of the defecation or urination functions.”371
b) When considering whether the poster intended to harass, humiliate,
or otherwise harm the victim courts may consider the following factors, plus any additional factors circumstances require:
i) whether the post appears on any revenge porn sites or sites similarly
designed to harass and humiliate;
ii) whether the poster included the victim’s personal or contact information or contact information for her family, friends or coworkers;
iii) whether the poster linked the images to the victim’s social networking pages.
iv) The fact a poster claims he posted the images as a joke shall not
aloneconstitute a defense, particularly when the defendant knew or
should have known the act could lead to harassment or harm to the
victim.
c) When considering whether the subject consented, courts should
consider:
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H.R. 260, 147th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. § 1335 (Del. 2014).
Franks, A Quick Guide, supra note 8, at 2.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5b-203 (West 2014).
H.R. 4320, 98th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2014).
Franks, A Quick Guide, supra note 8, at 2.
GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-90 (West 2014).

01/14/2015 15:25:42
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373.
374.
375.
376.
377.
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i) “the lack of specific agreement, approval, or assent to reproducing,
distributing, exhibiting, publishing, transmitting, or otherwise disseminating such visual depictions.”372
ii) due to the presumptive privacy expectation inherent in a dating or
sexual relationship with regard to sexually explicit images when a
person disseminates these images they must overcome this presumption by providing proof the victim consented including written consent; and
iii) the fact an individual took or agreed to have another take a sexually explicit image of herself for a specific individual does not mean
that individual gave up any reasonable expectation of privacy in that
image nor shall sharing the image with another indicate the victim intended the image be disseminated to third parties.
2) RIGHT TO PRIVACY: “A person who has consented to the capture or possession of an image within the context of a private or confidential relationship retains a reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to
disclosure beyond that relationship.”373 This statute creates a right to privacy
a) in any private or confidential relationship, including any intimate,
romantic, or sexual relationship.
b) when “the intimate image was created by or provided to the actor
under circumstances in which the individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy,”374 including “circumstances in which a reasonable
person would know or understand that the image was to remain private; and knows or should have known that the person in the image
has not consented to the dissemination.”375
c) when “[a] person who has consented to the capture or possession of
an image within the context of a private or confidential relationship retains a reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to disclosure beyond that relationship.”376
3) JURISDICTION: this statute shall apply to activities conducted
“within or outside of this state” if that conduct “involves an individual who
resides in” the state, unless the perpetrator is within the state, in which case
the violation need not affect an individual residing inside the state.377
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378. Id.
379. Id.
380. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1425 (2014) (West); See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-90 (West
2014); HAW. REV. STAT. § 711-1110.9 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Act 200); UTAH CODE ANN. § 765b-203 (West 2014); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 942.09 (West 2014); See also IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-6609
(West, Westlaw through 2014 Sess.); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-386.1 (West 2014); Cf. Franks, A Quick
Guide, supra note 8, at 2.
381. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-7-107 (West 2014).
382. Id.
383. HAW. REV. STAT. § 711-1110.9 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Act 200).
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4) EXCEPTIONS: it shall not be a crime to post images for:
a) lawful purposes, including images for law enforcement purposes, to
report unlawful conduct, criminal investigations, or for legal proceedings whether criminal or civil;
b) “legitimate medical, scientific or educational activities;”378
c) to show impropriety, political malfeasance, or misconduct on the
part of a public official;
d) when an individual posts a sexually explicit image of himself or
herself;379 and
e) for “voluntary exposure in public or commercial settings” including
but not limited to commercial pornography, theatrical, film or video
productions, and for other nudity occurring in or sexual acts performed voluntarily in public.380
5) REMEDIES: this statute creates:
a) a private cause of action: an individual who is the subject of an image covered by this statute shall have a private cause of action against
the perpetrators, including those who captured the image either without the subject’s consent or knowledge, those who disseminate the image without consent or knowledge, and those who reproduce or republish the image without consent.381
b) a copyright for the subject: “[a]n individual whose private intimate
parts have been posted in accordance with this section shall retain a
protectable right of authorship regarding the commercial use of the
private image.”382 This includes the right to sue under copyright law
and to require websites to remove the image.
c) the right to removal of the images: “In addition to any penalties the
court may impose, the court may order the destruction of any recording made in violation of this section.”383
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6) LIABILITY:
a) For “a second or subsequent conviction for an offense under this
section that arises from a separate criminal episode”384 the offense is a
[higher level crime with the appropriate punishment].
b) Where the person has been convicted within the previous ten years
“immediately preceding the offense charged of two or more of the offenses specified in this section,” each on a different date “not part of a
common act, transaction, or scheme,”385 the punishment shall increase.
c) If the victim is less than 18 years of age386 or suffers from any kind
of disability, the first instance shall be punishable by a longer sentence
and higher fine than the initial offense for other victims.

APPENDIX B
GUIDELINES FOR LAWS PROHIBITING REVENGE PORN

Provide jurisdiction for effects felt within the state by subjecting individuals to prosecution for activities conducted “within or outside of this
state” if that conduct “involves an individual who resides in [Georgia]”
unless the person is within the state, in which case the violation need not
affect an individual residing inside the state.387

UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5b-203 (West 2014); See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-90 (West 2014).
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-386.1 (West 2014).
Id.
GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-90 (West 2014).
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-7-107 (West 2014).
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388.
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Define intent, including guidelines for judges such as “if he or she
posts or distributes through the use of social media or any web site any
photograph, video, or other image displaying the private intimate parts of
an identified or identifiable person;”388 or whether the post appears on any
revenge porn sites, or sites similarly designed to harass and humiliate;
whether the poster included personal or contact information such as a
name, address, or phone number, and whether the poster linked the images
to the victim’s social networking pages.
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Define consent, including guidelines for courts such as “the lack of
specific agreement, approval, or assent to reproducing, distributing, exhibiting, publishing, transmitting, or otherwise disseminating such visual depictions.”389
Specifically define body parts and actions that may not be depicted:
“the naked or undergarment-clad genitals, pubic area, buttocks, or any portion of the female breast below the top of the areola.”390
(i) graphic sexual intercourse, including genital-genital, oral-genital,
anal-genital, or oral-anal, whether between persons of the same or opposite sex, or lascivious simulated sexual intercourse where the genitals,
breast, or pubic area of any person is exhibited; (ii) graphic or lascivious
simulated; (I) bestiality; (II) masturbation; or (III) sadistic or masochistic
abuse; or (iii) graphic or simulated lascivious exhibition of the genitals
or pubic area of any person.391

Prohibit revenge porn based on its time place, manner and means: the
dissemination of sexually explicit images to harass, demean, or cause professional, psychological or emotional harm to the victim. The fact a poster
claims he posted the images as a joke alone shall not constitute a defense,
particularly when the defendant knew or should have known the images
could lead to harassment or harm to the victim.

Create a right to privacy within the context of an intimate relationship:
“circumstances in which a reasonable person would know or understand
that the image was to remain private; and knows or should have known that
the person in the image has not consented to the dissemination.”393

Id.
Franks, A Quick Guide, supra note 8, at 3.
18 USC § 2256; Franks, A Quick Guide, supra note 8, at 2.
Haw. Rev. Stat. § 711-1110.9 (West) 1(b)(i)(B).
H.B. 4320, 97th Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 2011).
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393.
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Exclude voluntary nudity, including voluntary nudity or sexual acts in
public and pornography; “When the person was voluntarily nude in public
or voluntarily engaging in sexual conduct in public; or Pursuant to a voluntary commercial transaction.”392
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Create a private cause of action based on the statute.394
Exclude images taken for lawful purposes including criminal investigations, civil suits, and images which demonstrate impropriety:
(1) The activities of law enforcement and prosecution agencies in the
investigation and prosecution of criminal offenses;
(2) Legitimate medical, scientific, or educational activities;
(3) Any person who transmits or posts a photograph or video depicting
only himself or herself engaged in nudity or sexually explicit conduct;
(4) The transmission or posting of a photograph or video that was
originally made for commercial purposes; or
(5) Any person who transmits or posts a photograph or video depicting
a person voluntarily engaged in nudity or sexually explicit conduct in
a public setting; or
(6) The transmission is made pursuant to or in anticipation of a civil
action.395
Provide for removal of those images found to violate the statute: “In
addition to any penalties the court may impose, the court may order the
destruction of any recording made in violation of this section.”396
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